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I INTRODUCTION 
Traumatic events are one of the major threats to mental health all over the world. In 
Germany between 21% and 24% of the general population have encountered at least one 
traumatic event in their life (Hauffa et al., 2011; Perkonigg, Kessler, Storz, & Wittchen, 
2000). In the aftermath of such an event, most survivors suffer from such symptoms as 
distressing intrusive memories or dreams of the event, physiological hyperarousal, emotional 
numbing, and avoidance of trauma reminders (McFarlane, 1988; Shalev, 1992). The 
majority of trauma survivors recover spontaneously within a few weeks after the traumatic 
event (see Figure I-1; Bonanno, 2005), however, for a significant number of them, these 
symptoms persist for several years (Bonanno, 2005; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & 
Nelson, 1995; Perkonigg et al., 2000). If the symptoms persist for more than one month and 
lead to clinically significant distress or impairment, this symptom complex is referred to as 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD; for diagnostic criteria see Appendix, Table VI-1; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
 
Figure I-1:  Prototypical trajectories of disruption in normal functioning during the 2-year period following a 
traumatic event (adapted from Bonanno, 2005). 
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The prevalence rates of PTSD in Germany vary from 1% to 3% (Hauffa et al., 2011; Jacobi 
et al., 2014; Spitzer et al., 2009). PTSD has, when compared to other mental and physical 
disorders, a particularly strong negative impact on quality of life and is associated with high 
levels of disability and work loss (Alonso et al., 2004). Considerable effort is therefore 
invested in understanding its etiology and refining the available intervention techniques. 
There is a broad consensus among researchers in the field that intrusive memories of the 
traumatic event are of crucial relevance to understanding PTSD and thus for the 
development of more efficient intervention techniques (Brewin, 2014; Ehlers, 2015; Foa, 
Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). Nevertheless, the memory mechanisms which cause the 
constant involuntary retrieval of distressing trauma memories are not sufficiently 
understood. To address this issue, the aim of this work is the examination of memory 
mechanisms underlying the development and treatment of intrusive trauma memories.  
In the following, I will first outline known risk factors for the development of PTSD, 
including neural abnormalities. Next, I will describe the typical characteristics of intrusive 
memories of traumatic events. I will then introduce well-established memory models that 
form the basis of our understanding of intrusive trauma memories and how memory is 
affected by stress. Next, I will provide an overview on research investigating memory 
control processes and discuss their relevance for PTSD. Thereafter, I will describe memory 
processes that are supposed to underlie the automatic recall of intrusive trauma memories in 
PTSD. After that, I will provide an overview of theory-guided intervention techniques to 
alleviate PTSD. Thereafter, I will evaluate different methodological approaches to study 
memory mechanisms underlying intrusive trauma memories. I will then provide evidence 
that a deficient ability to voluntarily suppress memory retrieval is a potential cognitive risk 
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factor for developing intrusive trauma memories (Chapter II: Memory Control and Intrusive 
Trauma Memories). Further on, I will provide evidence that associative learning is crucially 
involved in the automatic retrieval of intrusive trauma memories, and discuss whether this 
learning process mediates the therapeutic effects of one of the most effective intervention 
techniques for PTSD (i.e. imaginal exposure; Chapter III: Conditioned Responses to Trauma 
Reminders). Finally, I will summarize and discuss these findings and their implications with 
respect to ways of explaining intrusive trauma memories and intervention methods, consider 
limitations, and suggest an outlook and directions for future research. 
1 RISK FACTORS FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
As people differ greatly in how they are affected by traumatic events and how long they 
suffer from intrusive memories and posttraumatic stress (see Figure I-1; Bonanno, 2005), 
considerable effort has been made to understand which factors put people at risk for 
developing chronic PTSD. A growing number of pre-trauma risk factors have been shown to 
be associated with later PTSD (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; DiGangi et al., 2013; 
Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2008; Schmidt, Kaltwasser, & Wotjak, 2013). Pre-trauma risk 
factors include social, educational, and intellectual disadvantages, female gender, history of 
psychiatric disorders, family history of psychopathology, and prior trauma or life adversity 
(Brewin et al., 2000; DiGangi et al., 2013; Ozer et al., 2008). Specifically, recent meta-
analyses indicate that women are more likely to develop PTSD as compared to men (Brewin 
et al., 2000; DiGangi et al., 2013; Ozer et al., 2008). Several studies have revealed that lower 
pre-trauma intelligence increases the vulnerability for PTSD symptoms (Betts, Williams, 
Najman, Bor, & Alati, 2012; Breslau, Lucia, & Alvarado, 2006; Koenen, Moffitt, Poulton, 
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Martin, & Caspi, 2007; Macklin et al., 1998). Problematic coping styles like rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and avoidance (Gil & Caspi, 2006; Lengua, Long, & 
Meltzoff, 2006) have been found to be predisposing risk factors for PTSD. Furthermore, pre-
trauma personality factors like neuroticism (Engelhard, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2003; 
Knezevic, Opacic, Savic, & Priebe, 2005; Parslow, Jorm, & Christensen, 2006) and trait 
anxiety (McNally et al., 2011; Weems et al., 2007) have also been found to predict later 
PTSD. A number of studies have indicated that pre-trauma psychopathology is a predictor 
for developing PTSD after trauma (e.g. Heinrichs et al., 2005; Lengua et al., 2006; Orr et al., 
2012). As well, a variety of psychophysiological factors have been associated with 
subsequent PTSD, including startle reactivity (Orr et al., 2012; Pole et al., 2009), and 
salivary cortisol (Heinrichs et al., 2005; van Zuiden et al., 2011). Finally, a lack of social 
support (Koenen et al., 2007; Lengua et al., 2006) as well as lower socioeconomic status 
(Koenen et al., 2007) are pre-trauma risk factors for PTSD. In addition to these cognitive and 
environmental risk factors, particular characteristics of brain structures have been found to 
be associated with PTSD.  
1.1 NEURAL ABNORMALITIES IN POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
Recent neuroimaging findings indicate that particular abnormalities in brain structure and 
functioning are associated with to an enhanced vulnerability for developing PTSD. Over the 
last several years, a number of structural and functional abnormalities have been identified in 
patients with PTSD (e.g. Francati, Vermetten, & Bremner, 2007; Karl et al., 2006; Pitman et 
al., 2012; Rauch, Shin, & Phelps, 2006; Smith, 2005). Most of these studies, however, were 
conducted after the traumatic event, comparing PTSD patients to trauma-exposed or non-
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trauma-exposed healthy controls, which means the majority of these results do not 
distinguish abnormalities that reflect predisposing vulnerability factors from those that are a 
consequence of the trauma. To deal with this issue, Admon, Milad, and Hendler (2013) have 
reviewed neuroimaging studies, using genetic, environmental, twin, and prospective 
methods, and have proposed a model of neural abnormalities in PTSD that distinguishes 
between predisposing and acquired factors (see Figure I-2).  
 
Figure I-2:  Neural abnormalities in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
Orange areas mark the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Green areas mark the hippocampus and 
medial prefrontal cortex, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), 
and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; adapted from Admon, Milad, et al., 2013). 
They suggest that abnormal structure and heightened responsivity to negatively valenced 
stimuli of the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represent predisposing 
abnormalities and thus constitute neural vulnerability factors for developing PTSD. This is in 
line with a number of neuroimaging studies observing heightened amygdala and dACC 
Commonly hyperactive in PTSD                   Hyperfunction is predisposing 
Commonly hypoactive in PTSD                   Hypoconnectivity is acquired 
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activation in PTSD patients (e.g. Francati et al., 2007; Karl et al., 2006; Pitman et al., 2012; 
Rauch et al., 2006; Smith, 2005). As the amygdala and dACC have been found to mediate 
the generation and expression of fear (Graham & Milad, 2011; Phelps & Ledoux, 2005; Shin 
& Liberzon, 2010), these predisposing factors may lead to enhanced fear responses to 
traumatic events and prevent functional coping. On the other hand, reduced volume of brain 
regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (i.e. rostal anterior cingulated cortex, rACC; 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, vmPFC; orbitofrontal cortex, OFC) seem to reflect changes 
in brain structure that are acquired along with the development of PTSD (Kasai et al., 2008; 
Sekiguchi et al., 2013). Furthermore, reductions in functional and structural connectivity 
between the vmPFC and the hippocampus may accompany the development of PTSD 
following a traumatic event (Admon, Leykin, et al., 2013; Admon et al., 2009). As these 
structures have been linked to the ability to extinguish conditioned fear responses (see 
section I-5.4; Hartley, Fischl, & Phelps, 2011; Milad et al., 2009; Milad et al., 2005; Milad et 
al., 2007; Rauch et al., 2005), structural and functional changes of these areas may represent 
acquired neural abnormalities that lead to reduced inhibition of conditioned fear responses.  
Nevertheless, each of the factors described above accounts for a relatively small amount of 
variance (Admon, Milad, et al., 2013; Brewin et al., 2000), leading to the conclusion that the 
factors which determine who will and will not develop PTSD after trauma have not yet been 
fully revealed. As the vast majority of researchers from the field agree that intrusive 
memories of the traumatic event are of crucial relevance in PTSD, examining intrusive 
trauma memories may increase our understanding of this disorder and lead to more efficient 
intervention techniques (e.g. Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa 
et al., 1989). 
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2 INTRUSIVE MEMORIES OF TRAUMATIC EVENTS  
Involuntary memory retrieval is a very common phenomenon after traumatic events. This 
retrieval, which is very distressing, typically consists of brief sensory fragments of the event 
(Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). Intrusions 
can include all sensory modalities, including bodily sensations, however, the most frequently 
intrusive memories occur in the form of visual images (Ehlers et al., 2002; Hackmann, 
Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). Intrusive trauma 
memories are often very vivid and emotional, so that trauma survivors are in many cases not 
aware that they are experiencing a memory and instead report the impression that the event 
is happening in the here and now (Bremner, Krystal, Southwick, & Charney, 1995; Brewin 
et al., 1996; Hackmann et al., 2004; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005; Van der Kolk & 
Fisler, 1995). Furthermore, unlike ordinary autobiographical memories, intrusive trauma 
memories often lack contextual information that would normally associate the sensory 
memory with a corresponding time and place (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). 
Even though trauma survivors frequently describe intrusive trauma memories as “coming out 
of the blue”, they are actually triggered by a wide range of internal and external stimuli 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2004; Hackmann et al., 2004). Often these stimuli show 
sensory similarity to stimuli that have been encountered before or during the traumatic 
experience (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005) and bear no meaningful relationship to 
the traumatic event (Ehlers et al., 2002). The retrieval of traumatic memories is typically 
under limited voluntary control, leading PTSD patients to develop other strategies to prevent 
their occurrence, e.g. avoiding stimuli with the potential to trigger trauma memories 
(Brewin, 2001; Brewin et al., 1996; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). Contemporary 
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models of PTSD assume that the way memories of traumatic experiences are encoded, 
represented, and retrieved can explain intrusive memories (Brewin, 2001; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989). Understanding general 
human memory functions is therefore crucial to our understanding of intrusive trauma 
memories. 
3 MODELS OF HUMAN MEMORY 
As most researchers from the field agree that intrusive memories play a key role in our 
understanding of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989), 
uncovering the underlying mechanisms should provide further insights for identifying people 
at risk and for the development of more efficient intervention techniques. In order to 
understand how intrusive trauma memories occur, the essential models of human memory 
first need to be examined. Contemporary memory models which form the basis of current 
models of PTSD will therefore be described in the following section. 
3.1 TAXONOMY OF HUMAN MEMORY SYSTEMS 
A variety of information is stored in human memory. We remember our 18
th
 birthday, know 
that Berlin is the capital of Germany, and know how to ride a bicycle. This spectrum of 
different types of information is unlikely to be represented in only a single memory system. 
There is a broad consensus among researchers that our memory can be subdivided into 
declarative (explicit) and nondeclarative (implicit) memory (see Figure I-3; Squire, 2004; 
Squire & Zola, 1996).  
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Figure I-3:  A taxonomy of long-term memory system organization.  
While declarative memories are thought to be consciously accessible, nondeclarative memory representations allow only 
limited conscious access (adapted from Squire, 2004).  
Declarative memories are accessible for conscious retrieval and include semantic memories 
(i.e. memories of facts), as well as episodic memories (i.e. memories of personal 
experiences; Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Squire, 2004; Squire & Zola, 1996). Declarative 
memory is essentially associative, as it relates different memory components (e.g. words and 
objects; Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007). The neural correlate of this process can be found 
in various parts of the neocortex (e.g. lateral prefrontal cortex, LPFC; Levine et al., 2004; 
Ofen et al., 2007) projecting to the medial temporal lobes (e.g. hippocampus; Eichenbaum, 
2001; parahippocampal formation; Ofen et al., 2007).  
Nondeclarative memories form a heterogeneous collection of all memory representations 
that do not require involvement of consciousness (Squire & Zola, 1996). These include 
procedural memory (e.g. knowing how to ride a bicycle), priming (i.e. a change in the ability 
to identify, produce, or classify a stimulus as a result of prior encounter with the same or a 
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related stimulus), classical conditioning (i.e. a learning process in which a neutral stimulus 
comes to elicit a specific response after being repeatedly paired with another stimulus that 
elicits the response), nonassociative learning (i.e. a change in the response to a stimulus due 
to repeated exposure; e.g. habituation and sensitization; Squire & Zola, 1996). In contrast to 
declarative memory, none of these kinds of nondeclarative memory representations is 
thought to be primarily mediated by the hippocampus, instead, the brain areas thought to 
mediate these memory functions are also quite heterogeneous (Eichenbaum, 2001): While 
the neural correlate of procedural memory has been found in the striatum, priming is 
supposed to be mediated by areas in the neocortex, the amygdala is involved in emotional 
responses to classical conditioning, while the cerebellum is the basis of motoric reactions, 
and nonassociative learning is based on reflex pathways (Squire, 2004). 
3.2 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 
Another important concept that has been considered in models of PTSD is called 
autobiographical memory. According to Conway (2005), autobiographical memory is 
memory for the events in the individual’s life, so that, this concept overlaps to some extent 
with episodic memory (see section I-3.1). Conway (2003, p. 219) states, however, that 
episodic memories constitute short-term fragments of experiences, whereas “A uniquely 
human […] memory system represents conceptually organized autobiographical knowledge 
that provides a context or setting for episodic memories […] this system controls the output 
of the episodic system by directly inhibiting/activating it and by selecting and modifying the 
cues used to access it.”  
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Figure I-4:  The knowledge structures within autobiographical memory (adapted from Conway, 2005). 
In his model, Conway (2005) argues that the autobiographical knowledge base is structured 
hierarchically (see Figure I-4): An overall life story is linked to several global themes, e.g. 
“work” or “personal relationships”. These themes are divided according to the time period in 
which they occurred (e.g. “When I was a PhD student”). These lifetime periods include 
several general events containing more specific information about individuals, institutions, 
or activities involved in them (e.g. “Prof. Smith”, “psychology department”, or “department 
talks”). These general events also exist at a relatively abstract level, but can lead to specific 
episodic memories (e.g. “Prof. Smith’s last department talk at the psychology department”) 
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that provide detailed perceptual information (e.g. “the expression on Prof. Smith’s face when 
he ended his last talk”). Conway (2005) further postulates the existence of the working self, a 
central control process that controls access to the autobiographical knowledge base. The 
working self can manipulate memory cues that activate memory representations in the 
autobiographical knowledge base, and thus can control both encoding and retrieval of 
specific episodic memories (Conway, 2005).  
3.3 STRESS-RELATED CHANGES IN MEMORY FUNCTIONS  
Memory functions are affected by stress in several ways (Roozendaal, McEwen, & Chattarji, 
2009). In addition to preparing the individual for coping with an acute danger or threat, 
another function of stress is to establish long-term adaptive responses (McEwen, 1998). 
Memories for emotionally arousing or stressful experiences are often very detailed and vivid 
(Dolcos, Denkova, & Dolcos, 2012; Mather, 2007; Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Roozendaal 
et al., 2009) and are more resistant to being forgotten over time (Ritchey, Dolcos, & Cabeza, 
2008). However, these studies have focused on memory for individual items, thereby 
neglecting memory for contextual or relational information (i.e. associative memory). With 
regard to stress-related alterations in associative memory, the results are less clear: Some 
studies find enhanced memory for contextual or relational information (D'Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2005; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005), while 
others find impaired memory for this kind of information (Cook, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; 
Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Pierce & 
Kensinger, 2011) or no differences (Mather, Gorlick, & Nesmith, 2009). What follows will 
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describe various explanations which have been put forward to resolve these contradictory 
findings.  
Mather (2007) has outlined an object-based framework that predicts when arousal enhances 
memory binding and when it impairs it, thereby building on the findings that focused 
attention is required for binding features of objects together (Treisman, 1999) and that 
emotional stimuli have the potential to attract attention (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; 
Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). She has proposed that an attentional focus, as is 
typically observed with emotionally arousing stimuli (Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005), 
enhances within-object binding, and thus enhances memory of associated within-object 
features (e.g. color of the object). As the attentional focus, however, is limited solely to the 
emotional object, it does not promote memory binding with other objects or contextual 
features and can even impair the creation of these associations. Contextual memory for 
within-stimulus details should therefore be enhanced due to emotional arousal, while 
contextual memory for those between stimuli should be impaired.  
Recently, Chiu, Dolcos, Gonsalves, and Cohen (2013) have emphasized the critical role of 
underlying memory representations of an item and contextual memories in this context. 
Specifically, they propose that studies showing memory enhancement with emotional 
arousal tend to involve stimulus properties that are perceptual or conceptual, and thus can be 
“unitized” to be represented as a single item. In contrast, relational memory representations, 
such as contextual information or information about relationships to other stimuli, are 
thought to be impaired due to emotional arousal. The neural basis for the differential impact 
of emotion on these memory representations is supposed to be found in the hippocampus: 
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Several findings indicate that relational memory representations strongly depend on the 
hippocampus, while item memory is largely independent of hippocampal involvement 
(Cohen, Poldrack, & Eichenbaum, 1997; Cohen et al., 1999; Diana, Yonelinas, & 
Ranganath, 2008; Konkel & Cohen, 2009; Konkel, Warren, Duff, Tranel, & Cohen, 2008). 
There is also evidence that the interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus 
during high levels of stress can lead to reduced hippocampal functioning (for reviews see 
Lupien & Lepage, 2001; Radley & Morrison, 2005; Sapolsky, 2004). Following Chiu et al. 
(2013), stress-related impairments in hippocampal functioning should cause deficits in 
relational memory, while leaving memory for (unitized) items unimpaired. Assuming that is 
true, impaired encoding of relational information during traumatic events may create 
memory representations that lack contextual information, potentially leading to vividly 
remembered fragments of the traumatic events without contextual information, as well as to 
the extensive recollection of trauma memories typically observed in PTSD. 
Since, the majority of trauma survivors recover quickly after traumatic events, they must 
therefore be able to control this automatic retrieval of trauma memories, indicating that the 
ability to control memory retrieval may help in recovering from traumatic events. The 
following paragraphs will discuss research which examines these memory control processes 
and their effects on memory representations, as well as implications for intrusive trauma 
memories.  
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4 MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES 
As traumatic events are highly aversive, one obvious reaction after such events is to try to 
exclude them from awareness. It has been proposed that active control processes can be 
engaged to inhibit either memory encoding or retrieval of unwanted memories and that this 
inhibition leads to a reduced likelihood of that memory being retrieved again, a process 
called motivated forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Even though this is a rather 
controversial issue, as some researchers claim that suppressing a thought actually increases 
its tendency to occur again (Purdon, 1999; Wegner, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White, 1987; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), there is growing evidence for successful motivated 
forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). To reduce the likelihood of subsequent memory 
retrieval, inhibitory control can be engaged either during memory encoding or retrieval. On 
the one hand, inhibiting memory encoding may prevent the consolidation of memory traces. 
Stopping memory retrieval, on the other hand, may decrease the subsequent accessibility of a 
memory by preventing the automatic process of retrieving an associated memory as a 
reaction to a cue. The following section will discuss various approaches to investigating 
these different aspects of motivated forgetting and how they may relate to intrusive trauma 
memories. 
4.1 DIRECTED FORGETTING 
Whether people can voluntarily forget recently encountered information when they are 
instructed to do so, has often been studied by means of the directed forgetting procedure 
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(Bjork, 1972, 1989). Two variants of this paradigm have been established: item-method 
directed forgetting and list-method directed forgetting.  
In item-method directed forgetting paradigms, participants are presented with a series of 
stimuli to study. After each stimulus they are instructed either to remember or to forget it. 
Participants are tested afterwards for all of the previously studied items. The to-be-forgotten 
stimuli are often less well remembered as compared to the to-be-remembered stimuli 
(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Item-method directed forgetting effects have been observed 
in recall and recognition tests, as well as in implicit memory tests (Basden, 1996; Basden, 
Basden, & Gargano, 1993; MacLeod & Daniels, 2000). These forgetting effects are usually 
explained by selective rehearsal, meaning that to-be-forgotten items are not further 
processed and thus are more likely to be forgotten than to-be-remembered items, which are 
actively rehearsed (Bjork, 1989). Nevertheless, Anderson and Hanslmayr (2014) have 
proposed that active inhibitory control processes may actually be involved in this process. 
This assumption is based on findings that the forget condition is more effortful than the 
remember condition (Fawcett & Taylor, 2008) and that it shares mechanisms with stopping a 
motor action (Fawcett & Taylor, 2010). Whether active inhibitory control processes are 
involved in this form of forgetting therefore remains an open issue. 
In the list-method directed forgetting procedure, participants study an entire list of words and 
are subsequently instructed to remember or forget the whole list. Afterwards, participants 
study a second list and are subsequently instructed to remember the preceding list. After the 
second list, recall is tested. Participants typically recall fewer words from the first list when 
they were instructed to forget the list as compared with being instructed to remember it 
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(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Participants often recall more items from the second list 
when they have been instructed to forget the first list as compared with being instructed to 
remember it (Bäuml, Pastötter, & Hanslmayr, 2010). These effects have been reported for 
free recall, cued recall, and recognition tests (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). There is also 
some evidence that active control mechanisms may be involved in this phenomenon, as brain 
oscillations and pupillary reactions indicate a higher cognitive load after the forget 
instruction as compared to the remember instruction (Bäuml, Hanslmayr, Pastötter, & 
Klimesch, 2008; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983).  
As people differ in the ability to voluntarily forget, differences in directed forgetting could 
also be involved in determining to what extend people suffer from intrusive memories after 
traumatic events. To examine this relationship, Zwissler et al. (2012) assessed directed 
forgetting in trauma survivors. They found that PTSD patients showed reduced item-method 
directed forgetting as compared to trauma-exposed controls with no PTSD, indicating that 
memory control ability is reduced in trauma survivors with PTSD (for similar results see 
Cottencin et al., 2006). However, because directed forgetting was examined after the 
traumatic event, it remains unclear whether deficient directed forgetting constitutes a factor 
of vulnerability or a consequence of the disorder. Prospective studies are therefore needed to 
investigate, whether differences in memory control can predict later intrusive trauma 
memories. 
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4.2 RETRIEVAL-INDUCED FORGETTING 
Another active mechanism that leads to forgetting has been found in the phenomenon of 
retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). This phenomenon describes 
how the act of remembering can cause forgetting of related information in memory. 
Retrieval-induced forgetting is typically studied with the following paradigm: Participants 
study a list of items in which each item is associated with two other items (e.g. word-pairs: 
fruits – apple, fruits – orange). One of these associations is repeatedly practiced afterwards 
(e.g. given the retrieval cue fruits – a___), while the other is not repeated. Following this 
practice, a recall test for all items is completed. Typically, the non-practiced items (e.g. 
orange) are less well remembered than practiced items and are even impaired when 
compared to a control condition of stimuli that have not been studied before (e.g. fruits – 
b___). This impairment has been attributed to an inhibitory control mechanism that 
suppresses retrieval of the non-practiced item in order to reduce interference caused by 
competing memory traces (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Bäuml & 
Aslan, 2004).  
However, the only study so far which has investigated retrieval-induced forgetting in 
trauma-survivors found no significant differences between participants with PTSD and 
participants without PTSD (Blix & Brennen, 2012), so it remains unclear whether the same 
inhibitory process is involved in suppressing trauma memories.  
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4.3 SUPPRESSION-INDUCED FORGETTING 
Another active forgetting process that supposedly involves inhibitory control is retrieval 
suppression (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). It refers to the 
process implemented when people are confronted with reminders of an unpleasant memory 
and try to exclude the unwanted memory from awareness. Anderson and Green (2001) 
proposed the existence of a cognitive control mechanism that is able to accomplish this by 
blocking retrieval of the unwanted memory. Analogous to stopping a reflexive motor action, 
retrieval suppression can prevent an unwanted memory from entering awareness (Anderson 
& Green, 2001).  
To investigate suppression-induced forgetting, Anderson and Green (2001) developed the 
think/no-think (TNT) task. This task simulates situations where one is confronted with a 
reminder of an unwanted memory and tries to suppress its retrieval. Numerous studies using 
the TNT task have found that when memory retrieval is suppressed, participants are less able 
to subsequently recall that memory, even when they are instructed to do so (Anderson et al., 
2004; Benoit, Hulbert, Huddleston, & Anderson, 2014; Küpper, Benoit, Dalgleish, & 
Anderson, 2014). This effect increases systematically with the number of times the no-think 
items are suppressed (Anderson & Green, 2001; Joormann, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 
2005; Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009). Suppression-induced forgetting has been 
demonstrated as well for negatively valenced stimuli, including words and scenes (Depue, 
Curran, & Banich, 2007; Küpper et al., 2014; Lambert, Good, & Kirk, 2010; van Schie, 
Geraerts, & Anderson, 2013). As suppression-induced forgetting has also been observed 
when a novel cue is used to test memory retrieval, the general accessibility of that memory 
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trace seems to be affected (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012). This 
is taken as evidence for an active control process being involved in retrieval suppression 
(Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; for an alternative explanation see 
Tomlinson, Huber, Rieth, & Davelaar, 2009).  
The electrophysiological correlate of this control process has been found in the N2 event-
related potential (ERP) component, which had previously been linked to inhibition of a 
prepotent motor response (Bergström, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009a, 2009b; 
Mecklinger, Parra, & Waldhauser, 2009; Waldhauser, Lindgren, & Johansson, 2012). The 
amplitude of this component is even able to predict whether a memory has been successfully 
suppressed or not, meaning that its probability of being recalled in a subsequent memory test 
is reduced (Mecklinger et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is evidence indicating that the neural 
mechanism underlying retrieval suppression is a down-regulation of mediotemporal lobe 
(MTL) activity, especially in the hippocampus, by control processes in the prefrontal cortex, 
especially the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(vlPFC; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit et al., 2014). These 
findings suggest that retrieval suppression is accomplished by a prefrontal inhibitory process 
that down-regulates recollection of episodic memories in the hippocampus.  
It seems plausible therefore to assume that the same inhibitory processes involved in 
retrieval suppression during the TNT task is also involved in stopping the involuntary 
retrieval of traumatic memories after trauma. Indeed, a recent study assessing retrieval 
suppression in trauma survivors has found that traumatized participants with PTSD show 
deficits in suppressing retrieval of aversive images as compared to traumatized participants 
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without PTSD (Catarino, Kupper, Werner-Seidler, Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2015). Because it 
remains unclear, however, whether these deficits existed before the trauma and thus 
promoted PTSD development, or whether they are simply a consequence of the disorder, 
prospective studies are needed to examine whether deficient memory control ability is a pre-
existing cognitive risk factor for the development of intrusive trauma memories and PTSD 
after a traumatic event. 
4.4 AIMS OF STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA 
MEMORIES 
This thesis aims to follow that line of research and investigate whether pre-trauma memory 
control ability can predict later intrusive memories and other PTSD symptoms. In addition, it 
examines whether neural correlates of inhibitory control processes found to be associated 
with retrieval suppression, along with the inhibition of a prepotent motor response, can also 
predict reduced intrusive trauma memories, and thus are likely to be involved in controlling 
their automatic retrieval, as well. As the concept of retrieval suppression is the most 
naturalistic analogue to situations in which a trauma exposed person is confronted with a 
potential memory cue of the traumatic event, examining this phenomenon in relation to 
intrusive trauma memories will provide the most relevant insights. The first study therefore 
examines the relationship between suppression-induced forgetting and its neural correlates to 
intrusive memories after traumatic events. 
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5 MEMORY PROCESSES UNDERLYING AUTOMATIC TRAUMA MEMORY 
RECALL 
Intrusive trauma memories differ from other episodic memories in a number of qualities: 
Intrusions are triggered by a wide range of reminders and are under limited voluntary control 
(Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003). Whereas episodic memories usually are 
recognized as memories (Tulving, 1983), trauma survivors often are not aware that 
intrusions are memories of the traumatic event and instead experience them as happening in 
the “here and now” (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). There is broad consensus 
among researchers that dysfunctional encoding and/or retrieval of trauma memories can 
account for the occurrence of intrusive trauma memories (Brewin, 2001; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989). The following sections focus 
on memory mechanisms that have been suggested as involved in the development and 
occurrence of intrusive trauma memories.  
5.1 DEFICIENT MEMORY INTEGRATION 
Unlike ordinary autobiographical memories that are usually under voluntary control, 
memories of traumatic events often are retrieved unintentionally. It has been proposed that 
the extreme stress experienced during traumatic situations leads to memory representations 
that differ fundamentally from other autobiographical memory representations (Brewin, 
2001; Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Research on autobiographical memories in 
non-traumatized participants indicates that autobiographical events are usually incorporated 
into an autobiographical memory knowledge base (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and 
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that this elaboration in turn facilitates intentional retrieval and, more importantly, allows the 
inhibition of automatic retrieval triggered by associated memory cues (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). In PTSD patients, however, this elaboration seems to fail, preventing an 
appropriate control of the automatic retrieval of trauma memories (Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). 
Several findings indicate that during emotionally arousing events encoding of relational 
information is impaired (see section I-3.3; Bremner et al., 1995; Lupien & Lepage, 2001; 
Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998). During high levels of stress the interaction between the 
hippocampus and the amygdala can lead to a decline in hippocampal functioning (Bremner 
et al., 1995; Lupien & Lepage, 2001; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; Radley & Morrison, 2005; 
Sapolsky, 2004). Reduced hippocampal activity in turn leads to deficient binding of 
individual features of the experience into a coherent memory, which produces memory 
representations that are less accessible to voluntary memory retrieval. This explanation can 
account for why trauma survivors sometimes are not able to voluntarily recall all contextual 
details of the traumatic event (Brewin, 2001). Activity in the amygdala, however, is 
generally enhanced as stress increases, leading to the formation of strong conditioned 
responses (Pitman, Shalev, & Orr, 2000). In concert, these reactions may bring about 
memory representations that can easily be triggered by cue-driven retrieval and at the same 
time are less accessible to inhibitory control mechanisms (Brewin, 2001; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). These findings correspond to the clinical observations of PTSD 
patients experiencing involuntary intrusive trauma memory retrieval that is triggered by 
trauma-associated stimuli and can hardly be controlled voluntarily. 
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5.2 ENHANCED PERCEPTUAL PRIMING 
To trigger a traumatic memory, trauma-associated stimuli first need to be perceived. A 
lowered perceptual threshold in PTSD patients may contribute to the extensive retrieval of 
traumatic memories and this may be due to perceptual priming (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
The perception and identification of a stimulus is improved when that stimulus has been 
encountered before. Participants typically show lower perceptual identification thresholds 
for repeated stimuli, and are both more accurate and faster in identifying repeated stimuli as 
compared to new stimuli (Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). 
This form of nondeclarative memory has been referred to as perceptual priming. Despite 
severe impairments in explicit memory tests that require conscious recollection of previously 
encountered information, amnestic patients often show unimpaired perceptual priming 
effects (Hamann & Squire, 1997). Furthermore, while explicit memory typically declines 
over time (Wickelgren, 1972), perceptual priming effects are very stable over time (Musen 
& Treisman, 1990; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982), and have even been reported after a 
delay of 48 weeks (Cave, 1997). Perceptual priming can also occur for stimuli that are 
perceptually similar to a previously encountered stimulus (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & 
Moore, 1992; Seamon et al., 1997), and is not impaired when attention is divided (Kellogg, 
Newcombe, Kammer, & Schmitt, 1996) or the stimuli are irrelevant during encoding 
(Szymanski & MacLeod, 1996).  
Based on these findings, Ehlers and Clark (2000) have suggested that perceptual priming is 
especially pronounced during traumatic situations, which leads to a lowered threshold for 
stimuli that were perceived during trauma. As perceptual priming can also occur for 
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perceptually similar stimuli, stimuli that only bear some similarity to those present during 
the trauma should also have lower perceptual thresholds in the aftermath of a traumatic 
event. Perceiving potential trauma reminders in neutral environments would, in turn, lead to 
a higher probability of trauma memories being retrieved. 
Perceptual priming effects for traumatic events have recently been investigated by means of 
experimental analogue paradigms. Healthy participants were presented with traumatic and 
neutral picture stories, and then subsequently given a test of implicit memory. In this test 
they had to identify blurred versions of neutral visual stimuli that were presented during the 
picture stories. Stimuli originally presented in the traumatic picture stories showed enhanced 
perceptual priming effects (i.e. higher identification rates) as compared to those presented 
during the neutral picture stories (e.g., Arntz, de Groot, & Kindt, 2005; Ehlers, Mauchnik, & 
Handley, 2012; Ehlers, Michael, Chen, Payne, & Shan, 2006; Holz, Lass-Hennemann, Streb, 
Pfaltz, & Michael, 2014; Michael & Ehlers, 2007). This enhanced perceptual priming effect 
was also shown to predict intrusive memories of the traumatic picture stories in the 
following week (Ehlers et al., 2012; Ehlers et al., 2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).  
An enhanced perceptual priming effect for trauma-related stimuli has also been found in a 
study of trauma survivors (Kleim, Ehring, & Ehlers, 2012). Participants with PTSD had a 
higher likelihood of identifying blurred trauma-related pictures as compared to general threat 
pictures or neutral pictures, whereas trauma survivors without PTSD did not show these 
perceptual priming effects. This processing advantage for trauma-related pictures also 
predicted PTSD symptoms at six-month follow-up assessments. Other studies employing a 
number of different paradigms to examine perceptual priming in trauma survivors have also 
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found specific perceptual priming effects only in those participants that later developed 
PTSD (Amir, Leiner, & Bomyea, 2010; Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005). 
5.3 PERCEPTUAL MEMORY PROCESSING 
Roediger (1990) has suggested that memory performance benefits from the extent to which 
cognitive operations at retrieval recapitulate those engaged during encoding. If, therefore, a 
memory’s encoding was mainly data-driven (i.e. primarily encoding perceptual features 
rather than conceptual information), its memory representation will be more accessible to 
data-driven recall, whereas, if a memory is encoded semantically it will be more accessible 
to semantic retrieval. Support for this hypothesis comes from neuroimaging studies 
indicating that the cortical activity during encoding of a stimulus is reinstated when the 
stimulus is subsequently retrieved (Danker & Anderson, 2010; Dewhurst & Knott, 2010; 
Johnson & Rugg, 2007).  
In building on this framework, Ehlers and Clark (2000) have suggested that data-driven 
processing during traumatic situations facilitates data-driven recall and thus puts people at 
risk for experiencing intrusive memories when confronted with trauma reminders. To test 
whether data-driven processing of traumatic events predicts subsequent PTSD symptoms, 
peri-traumatic data-driven processing was assessed via questionnaires in survivors of motor 
vehicle accidents (Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008) and assault survivors (Halligan et al., 
2003). In line with the hypothesis, data-driven processing did predict PTSD severity six 
months later, however, these studies rely on retrospective ratings and thus provide no 
evidence for a causal relationship between data-driven processing during trauma and 
subsequent intrusive memories. To address this issue, Halligan, Clark, and Ehlers (2002) 
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instructed healthy participants to engage in either data-driven processing or conceptual 
processing while they were watching traumatic film footage. Additionally, pre-experimental 
cognitive processing styles and cognitive processing during film presentation were assessed 
via questionnaires. Contrary to the hypothesis, the instructions had little influence on 
cognitive processing during film presentation, but participants who reported more data-
driven processing during film presentation, as well as more habitual data-driven processing 
subsequently developed more intrusive memories of the traumatic film. Kindt, van den Hout, 
Arntz, and Drost (2008) have been able to show that participants who were instructed to 
engage in data-driven processing in the aftermath of viewing a traumatic film had more 
intrusive trauma memories as compared to participants that were instructed to engage in 
conceptual processing. Furthermore, performing a distracting verbal task that interferes with 
conceptual processing (i.e. counting backwards in sevens) during trauma film presentation 
leads to more frequent intrusive trauma memories as compared to performing no additional 
task during film presentation (Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010), which supports 
the importance of perceptual processing for the development of intrusive trauma memories. 
5.4 FEAR CONDITIONING 
Another memory mechanism that is supposedly involved in the formation of intrusive 
trauma memories is fear conditioning. According to the fear conditioning approach, the 
traumatic event can be seen as an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) that triggers unconditioned 
responses (UCR) such as intense fear and arousal. Through spatial and temporal contiguity, 
this UCR becomes associated with neutral stimuli that are present during trauma 
(conditioned stimuli, CS). Subsequently, these CSs can trigger reactions similar to the 
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original emotional and physiological reactions to the trauma (conditioned responses, CRs; 
see also Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Keane, Zimering, & 
Caddell, 1985). According to this framework, intrusive trauma memories can be considered 
as CRs that are triggered by trauma-associated stimuli (CSs; Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 
1985; Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). Individual differences in the ease with which these 
associations are acquired and how durable they are over time (i.e. conditionability), as well 
as how likely they are to be transferred to similar stimuli (i.e. generalization), should 
therefore determine whether PTSD symptoms persist. The concept of enhanced 
conditionability assumes that people differ in their disposition to develop CRs when 
confronted with a traumatic event and/or to show reduced extinction learning of theses CRs 
(Orr et al., 2000). In line with this account, PTSD patients show enhanced CRs during 
acquisition and extinction as compared to trauma survivors without PTSD (Blechert, 
Michael, Vriends, Margraf, & Wilhelm, 2007; Orr et al., 2000). Lommen, Engelhard, 
Sijbrandij, van den Hout, and Hermans (2013) have been able to show that reduced 
extinction learning before a traumatic event predicts subsequent PTSD symptom severity. 
Wegerer, Blechert, Kerschbaum, and Wilhelm (2013), using short aversive film clips as 
UCSs, have also shown that reduced extinction learning (as indexed by valence ratings and 
SCRs) predicted subsequent intrusive memories of the aversive film clips, thus providing 
further evidence for associative learning being involved in the development of intrusive 
trauma memories.  
Nevertheless, fear conditioning paradigms often lack ecological validity, as the procedure is 
rather artificial and does not resemble the typical time course of a traumatic event. 
Furthermore, the studies mentioned above only assessed conditioned responses and 
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conditioned intrusive memories immediately after the acquisition procedure, which leaves 
open the critical question of whether these conditioned reactions remain stable over time. 
5.5 AIMS OF STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
To fill this gap, the second aim of this thesis is to examine the temporal stability of 
conditioned responses to trauma reminders. As conditioned associations are thought to 
account for intrusive trauma memories, this is a crucial precondition. Furthermore, this study 
aims to extend the previous findings from rather artificial laboratory paradigms to more 
naturalistic conditions that resemble more closely the complexity of real-life trauma and thus 
provide higher ecological validity. 
6 TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
With increasing understanding of the underlying mechanisms of PTSD, effective treatment 
methods have been developed. The next section will give an overview of the treatment 
methods currently available and discuss their supposed underlying functional mechanisms. 
As changes in the hormones and neurotransmitters have been reported in PTSD patients, 
several drug therapies have been used to treat PTSD, including tricyclic antidepressants, 
anticonvulsants and mood stabilizers (e.g. carbamazepine), benzodiazepines, monoamino 
oxidase inhibitors, and specific serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs; Friedman & Schnurr, 
1995; Sutherland & Davidson, 1994). A recent meta-analysis found significant superiority to 
placebo only for SSRIs (Hoskins et al., 2015), however, the reported effect sizes were 
relatively low when compared to psychological treatments (Bisson et al., 2007; Hoskins et 
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al., 2015). Psychological treatments are therefore recommended over pharmacological 
treatments as the method of choice for PTSD therapy (Benedek, Friedman, Zatzick, & 
Ursano, 2009; Forbes et al., 2007; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2005). 
A number of psychological treatments for PTSD have been developed, including trauma 
focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TFCBT; Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 1991; 
Foa et al., 1989), eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR; Shapiro, 1991), 
various stress-management programs (Carlson, Chemtob, Rusnak, Hedlund, & Muraoka, 
1998; Foa et al., 1991; Meichenbaum, 2007; Vaughan et al., 1994), supportive, non-directive 
therapy (Blanchard et al., 2003), hypnotherapy (Brom, Kleber, & Defares, 1989), 
psychodynamic therapy (Brom et al., 1989), and interpersonal therapy (Krupnick et al., 
2008).  
Several meta-analyses suggested that TFCBT and EMDR show the best treatment outcomes 
(Bisson et al., 2007; Bradley, Greene, Russ, Dutra, & Westen, 2005; Cloitre, 2009; Ehlers et 
al., 2010; Seidler & Wagner, 2006; Van Etten & Taylor, 1998; for contradictory results see 
Benish, Imel, & Wampold, 2008). Studies examining potential differences between these 
treatment methods have consistently found that they are equally effective (Bisson et al., 
2007; Bradley et al., 2005; Forbes et al., 2007; Seidler & Wagner, 2006). Both methods are 
trauma-focused, which means that the patient confronts memories of the traumatic event, 
and this imaginal exposure to the traumatic event may be the relevant component underlying 
the beneficial effects of these treatments. Despite their effectiveness, however, relatively 
little is known about the processes underlying these intervention effects.  
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As described above, traumatic memory representations in people with PTSD can easily be 
triggered by trauma reminders and at the same time are less accessible to intentional retrieval 
and, more importantly, to inhibitory control mechanisms (see section I-3.2; Brewin, 2001; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This kind of memory representation is thought to result 
from a lack of hippocampal processing due to extreme stress during encoding (see section I-
3.3; Bremner et al., 1995; Lupien & Lepage, 2001; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; Radley & 
Morrison, 2005; Sapolsky, 2004), which leads to uncontrolled, conditioned responses such 
as physiological reactions and cue-driven retrieval of trauma memories (Brewin, 2001; Foa 
et al., 1989; Pitman et al., 2000).  
Deliberately reactivating the trauma memory, including as many contextual details as 
possible (i.e. imaginal exposure), should therefore promote hippocampus-dependent binding 
with contextual information and thus enable conditioned responses to be inhibited 
voluntarily (Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In line with this reasoning, Ehlers et al. 
(2012), employing an analogue design, were able to show that imaginal exposure after an 
analogue trauma led subsequently to a reduction in both intrusive memories and negative 
evaluative conditioning (i.e. a change in valence of a neutral stimulus due to its pairing with 
another negative stimulus). It remains unclear, however, whether imaginal exposure also 
influences conditioned reactions to neutral trauma-associated stimuli, such as physiological 
arousal, negative mood, and intrusive trauma memories.  
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6.1 SUBSIDIARY AIMS OF STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA 
REMINDERS 
In the light of the assumption that conditioned responses to trauma-associated stimuli should 
be alleviated by imaginal exposure, the second study additionally aimed to examine whether 
imaginal exposure to the traumatic event can reduce the number and intensity of intrusive 
trauma memories triggered by trauma-associated stimuli, as well as conditioned 
physiological reactions. According to this approach, when people reactivate their trauma 
memories voluntarily, this promotes memory integration and thus reduces conditioned 
reactions, such as emotional arousal and intrusive trauma memories. 
7 METHODOLOGICAL PARADIGMS TO STUDY MEMORY PROCESSES 
UNDERLYING INTRUSIVE MEMORIES IN POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER 
To study the mechanisms underlying intrusive memories, different methodological 
paradigms have been developed, each of which presents its own advantages and drawbacks. 
Requirements for the implemented paradigms can vary widely depending upon the question 
being researched. The following section will discuss specific requirements for studying 
particular research questions and the sort of paradigms that can meet those requirements.  
7.1 CLINICAL FIELD STUDIES 
One common and obvious method for investigating intrusive trauma memories is to study 
people that have been exposed to a traumatic event. In these populations, different factors 
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can be assessed for trauma survivors immediately after the traumatic event and their 
potential to predict later intrusive memories can be evaluated (see the meta-analysis by Ozer 
et al., 2008). A substantial portion of our knowledge comes from such longitudinal studies. 
Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al. (2005), for example, examined assault survivors and found 
that subjective evaluations of the characteristics of intrusive memories after the assault could 
predict PTSD symptoms in a six-month follow-up better than mere intrusion frequency. 
Even though clinical field studies have a very high ecological validity, one shortcoming of 
many of these studies is that they rely on retrospective reports of the participants’ 
experiences (Candel & Merckelbach, 2004). As retrospective reports are very vulnerable to 
subsequent biases, prospective studies are essential for drawing reliable conclusions about 
causality. It is, however, clearly unjustifiable to intentionally expose participants to real-life 
traumatic events. One way to circumvent this problem is by studying people who are very 
likely to experience a traumatic event (e.g. due to their profession). A sample of fire-fighters, 
for example, has been tested before and after trauma exposure to draw conclusions about 
potential pre-existing risk factors for PTSD (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005). Even though these 
paradigms have produced important insights, the trauma itself, its context, and the person’s 
reactions during the trauma are not under experimental control in this design, thus making 
causal conclusions impossible. The only paradigms offering complete experimental control 
are analogue trauma studies.  
7.2 ANALOGUE TRAUMA STUDIES 
As it is clearly unethical to intentionally expose participants to a real-life traumatic event, 
researchers have tested different kinds of stressors that model important aspects of real-life 
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trauma and can cause similar memory phenomena without putting participants’ mental 
health at any risk. A range of analogue paradigms has been developed to investigate memory 
processes relevant to intrusive trauma memories. All involve exposing non-clinical 
participants to a laboratory equivalent of a traumatic event. Ehlers et al. (2006) exposed 
participants to picture stories describing traumatic events (e.g. somebody is killed by a 
housebreaker), using pictures of the international affective picture system (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and successfully induced intrusive memories. This picture story 
paradigm has the advantage of allowing neutral picture stimuli to be presented during the 
analogue trauma, so that perceptual priming for these trauma-associated stimuli could be 
assessed subsequently (see section I-5.2). Because, however, the picture stories are still 
relatively mild stressors, the typically observed number of intrusive memories is relatively 
low, and the resemblance to traumatic events is limited. 
Another promising approach for inducing analogue trauma under experimentally controlled 
conditions is the trauma film paradigm (for a review see Holmes & Bourne, 2008). By 
presenting to healthy participants a short film clip (ca. 10 min) depicting traumatic events 
(e.g. a car accident or a homicide), intrusive memories, negative mood, distress, and other 
analogues of PTSD symptoms can reliably be induced (Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Halligan 
et al., 2002; Laposa & Alden, 2006). As aversive film clips can cause relatively high 
emotional arousal (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010), the trauma film paradigm 
has considerable ecological validity. By assessing cognitive variables before film 
presentation, potential pre-existing risk factors can be examined by correlating them with 
subsequent intrusive memories and analogue PTSD symptoms. Additionally, stimuli that are 
present during the trauma and might later function as trauma reminders are also under 
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experimental control and thus can systematically be manipulated in order to study their 
potential to trigger later PTSD symptoms.  
In order to enhance the participants’ immersion in the traumatic situation, virtual reality 
environments have been implemented recently (Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 2015; Scheel 
et al., 2012). This method can induce intrusive memories at frequencies comparable to those 
observed in the trauma film paradigm (Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 2015). As well, these 
paradigms allow participants to interact with the environment to a certain extent. Although 
this enhances the sense of being involved in the event (Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 2015), 
it also diminishes experimental control of the situation, and thus the ability to compare 
participants. 
7.3 FEAR CONDITIONING STUDIES 
As associative learning is presumed to be an important factor in the development of PTSD 
(e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989), differential fear conditioning paradigms are 
thought to mimic some of the basic features of traumatic events with a high degree of 
experimental control.  
In these paradigms, one CS is paired with the UCS during the acquisition phase (CS+), while 
another CS is not paired with the UCS (CS-) and thus serves as a safety signal. Neutrally 
valenced picture stimuli are typically used as CSs and are paired with aversive stimuli (UCS) 
such as aversive noises or pictures, unpleasant electric stimulation, or air blasts (Kim & 
Jung, 2006; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009). In the following extinction phase, both CSs are 
presented without the UCS. The differential reactions to the CS+ and the CS- during 
INTRODUCTION 36 
 
acquisition and/or extinction are used as indexes of conditionability (Duits et al., 2015; 
Lissek et al., 2005). Examining fear conditioning in trauma survivors showed that PTSD 
patients have enhanced CRs during acquisition and extinction as compared to trauma 
survivors without PTSD (Blechert et al., 2007; Orr et al., 2000). Reduced extinction learning 
before a traumatic event could even predict subsequent severity of PTSD symptoms 
(Lommen et al., 2013).  
Because fear conditioning experiments can mimic only some aspects of a traumatic event 
and are unlikely to generate complex intrusive memories, Wegerer et al. (2013) developed a 
conditioned intrusion paradigm. In this paradigm they used short aversive film clips (25 s) as 
UCSs and paired them with neutral sounds (CSs). To model situations where one is exposed 
to potential trauma reminders, the CS sounds were presented again, faded in at intervals 
against a neutral background soundscape. This paradigm was able to successfully induce 
conditioned intrusive memories and demonstrated that conditionability of valance ratings 
and physiological arousal was associated with conditioned and spontaneous intrusive 
memories of the film clips. Even though this paradigm led to a significant advance in the 
ecological validity of fear conditioning as a model for PTSD, the paradigm is still somewhat 
artificial and does not depict the typical time course of a traumatic event.  
7.4 METHODOLOGICAL PARADIGMS USED IN THIS THESIS 
The research question addressed in Study 1, whether pre-trauma memory control can predict 
later intrusive trauma memories, clearly requires a prospective study design to make 
inferences about deficient memory control as a potential cognitive risk factor for PTSD. One 
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way to investigate this is by assessing memory control in participants who are very likely to 
be exposed to a traumatic event after the assessment. Field studies testing participants in 
high risk groups (e.g. fire fighters) often have the problem that prior traumatization is very 
likely among the group members, so that implementing such a field study design would have 
undermined the prospective character of the study. Furthermore, the diversity of traumatic 
events participants are exposed to in field studies leads to a great deal of uncontrolled 
variation in PTSD symptoms. This is especially disadvantageous, when between-subject 
factors are examined, as is necessary for investigating the current question. Paradigms using 
analogue traumatic events thus offer an efficient way to circumvent these problems. As the 
trauma film paradigm has been shown to cause a reasonable quality of intrusive memories 
without putting participants’ mental health at risk, it was implemented to simulate real-life 
trauma in this study.  
As Study 2 aimed to examine the question of whether conditioned responses to trauma 
reminders are involved in the development of intrusive trauma memories and their treatment, 
complete experimental control of stimuli present during the traumatic event is needed. 
Because this is impossible to achieve in a field study of traumatic events, the best method for 
investigating this is the trauma film paradigm. To control which stimulus associations are 
established during the traumatic event, the presentation of neutral sound stimuli was 
systematically manipulated during film presentation.  
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II MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES  
Following the lines of research reviewed above, Study 1 aims to investigate pre-trauma 
retrieval suppression ability in relation to intrusive trauma memories and other PTSD 
symptoms. It is hypothesized that a deficit in the ability to suppress memory retrieval of 
unwanted memories constitutes a potential cognitive risk factor for developing intrusive 
trauma memories and other PTSD symptoms after a traumatic event. Furthermore, the neural 
control mechanisms underlying retrieval suppression (as indexed by the N2 ERP component) 
are expected to predict later intrusive trauma memories and other PTSD symptoms. In the 
following, the article based on Study 1 is presented in the original form in which it was 
submitted for publication (apart from changes in formatting). 
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STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL ABILITY PREDICTS REDUCED POSTTRAUMATIC 
STRESS DISORDER SYMPTOMS AFTER ANALOGUE TRAUMA 
Co-Authors: Axel Mecklinger, Michael C. Anderson, Johanna Lass-Hennemann, and Tanja 
Michael 
1 ABSTRACT 
Most trauma survivors suffer from intrusive reexperiencing in the aftermath of trauma. For 
survivors’ well-being, it is key that these intrusions are controlled. Memory control can be 
exerted through retrieval suppression (RS). Poor RS, however, should be associated with 
persistent distressing intrusions and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This study tested 
the hypothesis that individual differences in RS ability predict intrusive reexperiencing after 
trauma. RS was examined with the think/no-think task (TNT) using behavioral and event 
related potential (ERP) measures. Twenty-four healthy participants watched a traumatic film 
after having performed the TNT task. Intrusion frequency, intrusion distress and other 
PTSD-like symptoms from the trauma film were measured with an electronic diary and the 
Impact of Event Scale (IES-R). In line with our hypothesis, behavioral measures of RS 
ability predicted reduced distress ratings for intrusions (r = -.53, p < .01). Further ERP 
markers of RS (a fronto-centrally distributed N2) predicted reduced distress ratings of 
intrusions (r = -.45, p < .05) and reduced scores on the IES-R (r = -.49, p < .01). Participants 
with lower RS ability exhibited PTSD-like symptoms after analogue trauma, suggesting that 
deficient memory control is a potential risk factor for developing PTSD.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of trauma, most trauma survivors suffer from intrusive memories of the 
traumatic event. While intrusive memories decline for some trauma survivors in the months 
after the trauma, others continuously suffer from them and develop posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). Although unwanted and highly 
distressing memories are an integral feature of PTSD, neither the presence nor the frequency 
of spontaneous trauma memories in the immediate aftermath of trauma is a good predictor of 
chronic PTSD (McFarlane, 1988; Shalev, 1992). However, the distress that accompanies 
such initial intrusions is a powerful predictor of persistent PTSD (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, 
et al., 2005). As intrusions in PTSD seriously undermine emotional well-being and cognitive 
functioning, PTSD is often considered a memory disorder (Brewin, 2011). Naturally, 
traumatized people are highly motivated to prevent trauma memories from spontaneously 
coming to mind, as they wish to reduce the distress and distraction they cause. Recent 
research indicates that retrieval suppression (RS) is a cognitive control mechanism that 
keeps unwanted memories at bay (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). However, the ability to 
inhibit memory retrieval varies substantially across people (Levy & Anderson, 2008, 2012), 
and thus it may offer an explanation why some people recover spontaneously after traumatic 
events, whereas others continuously suffer from extensive retrieval of trauma memories. 
Indeed, a recent ambulatory monitoring study has established that PTSD patients report 
remembering or reliving the traumatic event on average 22 times per week (Pfaltz, Michael, 
Meyer, & Wilhelm, 2013), highlighting the difficulties they have in controlling unwanted 
memories. Thus, a deficit in retrieval suppression may contribute to intrusive reexperiencing 
in PTSD. Accordingly, when people encounter reminders to a recently experienced trauma, 
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nearly everyone will experience memories intruding into their mind (Levy & Anderson, 
2008); but people who have strong retrieval suppression ability can eliminate these 
memories from awareness, and their tendency to intrude again in the future. On the other 
hand, people with a deficit in retrieval suppression will not be able to accomplish this, and 
will, as a result, keep experiencing intrusive memories. As a matter of fact, a recent study 
investigating the ability to suppress retrieval of aversive images in traumatized subjects with 
and without PTSD shows that retrieval suppression is compromised in PTSD patients 
(Catarino et al., 2015). Although this study links PTSD to retrieval suppression deficits, it 
cannot answer the question whether deficits in retrieval suppression result from PTSD or 
instead serve as a risk factor for its development.  
To study retrieval suppression of unwanted memories in the laboratory, Anderson and Green 
(Anderson & Green, 2001) developed the think/no-think (TNT) task. In this paradigm, 
people are repeatedly prompted with cues to previously learned memories and asked to 
either retrieve the memory (“think” trials), or to stop its retrieval (“no-think” trials). 
Numerous studies have found that no-think items are more poorly recalled on subsequent 
memory tests, an effect termed suppression-induced forgetting (Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Anderson et al., 2004). Recent neuroimaging studies found 
negative coupling between the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the 
hippocampus, indicating that a control process supported by the dlPFC down-regulates 
activity in the hippocampus to stop retrieval (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain, Henson, 
& Anderson, 2014). An electrophysiological correlate of this putative control process was 
found in a fronto-centrally distributed N2 component, a negative-going ERP component 
which is consistently larger during retrieval suppression than during retrieval (Bergström et 
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al., 2009b; Bergström, Velmans, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2007; Depue et al., 
2007; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 2012). Importantly, a larger N2 deflection 
during retrieval suppression predicts greater suppression-induced forgetting (Mecklinger et 
al., 2009). A correlation has also been demonstrated between the TNT N2 and the N2 
observed in a motor stopping task (Mecklinger et al., 2009), indicating that retrieval 
suppression and motor stopping similarly recruit general response inhibition mechanisms. 
Critically, these general control processes may also be involved in inhibiting involuntary 
retrieval of traumatic memories. Thus, measuring variation in the N2 during retrieval 
suppression may provide an important window into individual differences in the underlying 
neural mechanisms that determine which people are vulnerable to persistent intrusive 
memories in the aftermath of trauma.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that a deficit in memory control, as indexed by behavioral and 
ERP estimates of retrieval suppression, is a potential risk factor for extensive intrusive 
reexperiencing in PTSD. People who are good at retrieval suppression should also be more 
capable of limiting the accessibility of traumatic memories. To test this hypothesis, it is 
necessary to employ a prospective design that assesses retrieval suppression ability before a 
traumatic event occurs, and then examine how variation in this ability predicts response to 
the subsequent trauma. Such a prospective design is, naturally, very difficult to realize in 
clinical samples. A way to circumvent this problem is to use an analogue paradigm: The 
trauma film paradigm provides a prospective experimental tool for investigating intrusive 
memories in the laboratory. In this paradigm, healthy participants watch a traumatic film clip 
and are asked to record their intrusive memories of the film over the following days (Holmes 
& Bourne, 2008). To test our hypotheses we used a prospective design, combining the TNT 
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procedure and the trauma film paradigm. We first used the TNT procedure to estimate 
participants’ general retrieval suppression ability (using neutral word stimuli) with 
behavioral (suppression-induced forgetting) and ERP (N2) measures. After having 
performed the TNT, participants watched a traumatic and a neutral film clip. Analogue 
PTSD symptoms after the trauma film were measured both with an electronic diary and with 
the Impact of Event Scale (IES-R, a clinical standard questionnaire assessing PTSD 
symptoms: intrusive reexperiencing, avoidance, hyperarousal). We expected that participants 
with high retrieval suppression ability (as indexed by behavioral and ERP estimates) would 
show fewer intrusions than would participants with low retrieval suppression ability 
(Hypothesis 1). Because the distress caused by intrusions is known to strongly predict 
chronic PTSD and because participants (and patients in general) should be more motivated 
to inhibit distressing intrusions than non-distressing ones, we predicted that participants with 
low retrieval suppression ability (as indexed by behavioral and ERP estimates) would show 
more distressing intrusions (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we examined how well retrieval 
suppression ability (as indexed by behavioral and ERP estimates) predicts PTSD-like 
symptoms in general as measured with the IES-R (Hypothesis 3).  
3 METHOD 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-four non-psychology students (12 female, age ranged from 18 to 32 years, M = 24.7, 
SD = 4.20) were recruited on the campus of Saarland University and participated in 
exchange for 76 Euros. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were 
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native German speakers, right-handed, reported no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, and gave informed consent. The research was approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee of Saarland University. The electroencephalogram (EEG) 
data of three participants were excluded due to recording errors.
1
 
3.2 THINK/NO-THINK TASK 
Eighty-four weakly related neutrally valenced word pairs were composed (60 critical items 
and 24 filler items). Words were selected from a German standardized data base (Melinger 
& Weber, 2006). The selection of the final experimental word pairs was guided by a rating 
procedure. In this procedure words with orthographical and phonological similarities were 
excluded and only pairs with weak semantic relationship were included. Each word pair 
comprised a cue (left hand) and a response (right hand) word and was presented in the center 
of a 100 Hz computer display on a white background, using E-Prime 2.0 software 
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, USA). The critical pairs were rotated across 
experimental conditions (baseline, think, no-think) and across subjects. 
The TNT task consisted of four phases: Training, Practice, Think/No-Think, and Final 
Recall. The Training phase had three stages. First, each word pair was presented for 3400 ms 
(ISI: 600 ms). Second, participants overtly recalled the response to the cues, which were 
shown for up to 4000 ms, or until response. Following a 600 ms ISI, the correct response 
appeared for 1000 ms. This procedure was repeated until participants recalled at least 50% of 
                                                 
1
 All statistical analyses of behavioral data showed the same pattern of results for the complete and the reduced dataset 
without the three excluded participants. Behavioral results are reported for the complete sample. 
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the critical responses. Third, we presented each cue one more time for up to 3300 ms (ISI: 
1100 ms) to assess which responses had been learned. 
During Practice, all participants were trained on the TNT task, using the previously learned 
filler items. They were instructed to covertly recall the responses for cues presented in green 
(think condition), but to block out all thoughts of the associated responses for cues presented 
in red (no-think condition). Moreover, participants were instructed to not try to generate 
distracting thoughts in order to not think about the No-Think items but rather to control 
memory by simply suppressing retrieval (known as a “direct suppression” instruction; see 
Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergström et al., 2009b; LeMoult, Hertel, & Joormann, 2010). 
Think and no-think trials alternated pseudo-randomly. Each cue was on screen for 3000 ms 
(ISI: 1000 ms) — timings identical to the actual Think/No-Think phase. After the first half 
of the Practice phase a questionnaire was administered verbally to help identify any covert 
rehearsal of no-think items and allow the experimenter to give feedback to the participant to 
correct this problem (Bulevich, Roediger, Balota, & Butler, 2006). 
After practice, the critical Think/No-Think phase was split into five blocks. In each block, 
participants saw each cue of the think and no-think pairs twice. Within a block, a given cue 
was only repeated once all other cues had been presented. Thus, each critical item was 
retrieved or suppressed ten times. A short break (45s) separated each block. After the second 
block the questionnaire that was administered during Practice was administered again to 
avoid any covert rehearsal of no-think items. 
In the final test phase, participants were given cue words and asked to recall the associated 
response words — irrespective of prior instructions. The cues were presented for a 
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maximum of 3300 ms (ISI: 1100 ms). Cues were presented in block randomized format, 
with each block of 6 trials containing two items from each of the Think, No-think, and 
Baseline conditions, presented in random order.  
3.3 ANALOGUE TRAUMA 
All participants saw two film clips (one neutral and one traumatic) in pseudo-randomized 
order. The neutral film consisted of neutral scenes (11 min) from the movie Three Colors: 
Blue directed by Krzysztof Kieslowski (1993; Schaefer et al., 2010). The traumatic film 
consisted of neutral and violent scenes (11 min) from the movie Irreversible by Gaspar Noé 
(2002; Nixon, Nehmy, & Seymour, 2007; Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernandez, 
2009; Verwoerd, Wessel, & De Jong, 2010). After watching each film clip, an adapted 
version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) was administered, assessing how participants felt while watching the preceding film. 
Thereafter, participants were asked to rate how strongly each film caused physiological 
arousal on a 5-point scale going from “very slightly or not at all” to “extremely.”  
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF INTRUSIVE REEXPERIENCING AND ANALOGUE 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SYMPTOMS 
During the five days following film presentation, participants documented every intrusive 
film memory, using an iPod Touch (4
th
 gen., Apple Inc., Cupertino, USA) running Forms VI 
(Pendragon Software Corporation, Chicago, USA). The frequency of intrusive memories 
was determined by summing up their number from the neutral and the traumatic film 
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separately. For each memory, participants rated how distressing it was on a 10-point scale 
going from “not at all” to “extremely”. These ratings were averaged for the neutral and the 
traumatic film separately.  
Six days after film presentation, every participant completed the Impact of Event Scale -
Revised (IES-R; German translation; Maercker & Schützwohl, 1998; Weiss, Wilson, & 
Keane, 2004), a 22-item questionnaire assessing PTSD symptoms. Every item (e.g. “Things 
I saw or heard suddenly reminded me of it”) was rated on a 5-point scale spanning from “not 
at all” to “extremely”. 
3.5 PROCEDURE 
Participants were run individually, following written informed consent. On the first day, they 
were interviewed to exclude any axis I disorder (5th ed.; DSM-5;American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) or prior traumatic experience. The following day, participants performed 
the TNT task. During this task EEG was recorded. On the third day, participants watched the 
traumatic and the neutral film. Intrusions were documented over the following five days. Six 
days after film presentation participants completed the IES-R and were fully debriefed. 
3.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL MEASURES 
Performance data of the TNT task were analyzed using a mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with Response Condition (think, no-think, baseline) as within-subject factor and 
counterbalancing of items through each condition (three levels) as between-subject factor. 
To assess individual differences, we calculated a score for each participant’s retrieval 
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suppression ability by subtracting recall of no-think items from baseline items. Thus, 
participants with enhanced retrieval suppression ability had higher scores. This measure was 
z-normalized within that participant’s counterbalancing group to control for differences in 
the memorability between items (Anderson et al., 2004; Levy & Anderson, 2012).  
Correlation analyses focused on the association between behavioral and ERP estimates of 
retrieval suppression in the TNT task and intrusion measures (i.e. intrusions frequency and 
distress in the electronic diaries and the IES-R score). Pearson correlations were calculated.  
3.7 ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDING AND PREPROCESSING 
Subjects were seated in an electrically shielded room. While performing the TNT task, the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) was continually recorded from the scalp using a 72-channel 
active-electrode system (Biosemi Inc., Amsterdam, The Netherlands) with 64 standard 10-20 
electrode positions, 6 EOG channels (2 x VEOG, 1 x HEOG, 1 x REOG as the average of all 
6 channels referenced to averaged mastoids) and 2 mastoid reference channels. Absolute 
electrode offsets were kept below 30 mV, which is appropriate for this type of 
electroencephalogram amplifier. The EEG was recorded continuously in the DC to 128 Hz 
frequency range and A-D converted with 24 bit resolution at a sampling rate of 512 Hz. 
Continuous EEG data was re-referenced off-line from the Common Mode Sense (CMS) 
electrode to averaged mastoids and then filtered with a digital low-pass filter set to 30 Hz. 
Stimulus locked epochs were extracted between 200 ms pre until 1600 ms post onset of a 
given cue word. Epoched data was corrected for eye movement artefacts using the revised 
aligned-artefact average procedure suggested by Croft and Barry (Croft & Barry, 2000) by 
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means of hierarchical multiple linear regression using the vertical, horizontal, and radial 
EOG, using the data of an EOG calibration sequence included at the beginning of the 
experiment to allow for reliable estimations of the regression coefficients. The method for 
statistical control of artifacts (Junghöfer, Elbert, Tucker, & Rockstroh, 2000) was then used 
for further editing and artefact rejection. This procedure detects individual channel artifacts, 
detects global artifacts, replaces artifact-contaminated sensors with spline interpolation 
statistically weighted on the basis of all remaining sensors, and computes the variance of the 
signal across trials to document the stability of the averaged waveform. The rejection of 
artifact-contaminated trials and sensor epochs relies on the calculation of statistical 
parameters for the absolute measured scalp potential amplitudes over time, their standard 
deviation over time, the maximum of their gradient over time (first temporal derivative), and 
the determination of boundaries for each of these three parameters. Baseline correction was 
calculated from 200 ms before stimulus onset to stimulus onset. Finally, clean data epochs 
were averaged for each participant and for each think or no-think trial.  
3.8 ERP STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
ERP waveforms for think and no-think trials were quantified by measuring the mean 
amplitudes in two time windows (180-240 ms, 350-450 ms). Selection of these time 
windows was based on visual inspection and previous ERP research (Mecklinger et al., 
2009). Statistical analysis of the ERP data was based on the following electrodes: frontal 
(F3, Fz, F4), central (C3, Cz, C4), and parietal (P3, Pz, P4). To quantify individual 
differences, ERPs to no-think items were subtracted from ERPs to think items. Thus, 
subjects with higher negativity for no-think items, had numerically larger scores. These 
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measures were z-normalized within each counterbalancing condition (as described above). 
Scores from FCz recording site were used for the correlational analyses, as the ERP 
subtraction measures in both time windows were largest at this recording site.  
4 RESULTS 
4.1 SUPPRESSION-INDUCED FORGETTING WAS OBSERVED 
We found significant suppression-induced forgetting effects in the TNT task, as no-think 
items were more poorly recalled than were baseline items (Figure II-1; F(1, 21) = 7.16, 
p = .01, ηp
2
 = .254).
2
  
 
Figure II-1:  Cued recall rates for previously learned word pairs.  
Recall was reduced in the no-think condition compared to the baseline condition and the think condition. Error bars 
represent the standard error following Cousineau-Morey corrections for within-subject designs (Cousineau, 2005; O’Brien 
& Cousineau, 2014). 
                                                 
2
 The two-way ANOVA with Response Condition (think, no-think, baseline) as within-subject factor and counterbalancing 
of items through each condition (three levels) as between-subject factor revealed a main effect of Response Condition 
(F(2, 42) = 5.34, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .203). No main effect for counterbalancing of items was observed (F(2, 21) = 1.08, p = .36, 
ηp
2
 = .093). Also no significant interaction between the two factors was observed (F(4, 42) = 1.71, p = .17, ηp
2
 = .151). 
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This indicates that participants were able to suppress memory retrieval successfully, which 
led to reduced ability to recall the memory. No-think recall was also lower than think recall 
(F(1, 21) = 12.60, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .375). No significant difference was found between think 
recall and baseline recall (F(1, 21) = 0.34, p = .57, ηp
2
 = .033). As the baseline recall rate 
was relatively high, this may be due to ceiling effects. 
Grand average ERPs revealed pronounced differences between the think and no-think 
conditions (Figure II-2A). The first ERP effect consisted of an enhanced early negativity 
(~200 ms) that was larger in the no-think condition than in the think condition. As apparent 
from Figure II-2B, the early negativity to no-think trials had a broad bilateral distribution 
and co-occurred with a positive (P2) deflection to think trials. The largest differences 
between think and no-think trials emerged at frontal and central sites (Bergström et al., 
2009a; Mecklinger et al., 2009, for similar results). The early negativity was followed by a 
second negative going component with a similar fronto-central maximum that peaked around 
400 ms. As it resembled the N2 component related to motor stopping in previous studies 
(Mecklinger et al., 2009), it will be referred to as the N2 effect in the following. Notably, the 
N2 was larger for no-think than for think trials, indicating that it reflects a process relevant 
for retrieval suppression. 
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Figure II-2:  ERP analysis of the think/no-think task. 
(A) Grand average ERPs for the think and no-think condition during the think/no-think phase for all word pairs depicted at 
the Fz, FCz, Cz, and Pz recording sites. Arrows illustrate the early negativity and the N2 components. (B) Topographic maps 
showing the scalp distributions of the ERP differences between think and no-think Items. Grand average difference waves 
were computed by subtracting the no-think condition from the think condition. The electrodes used for statistical 
analyses are highlighted in white. 
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4.2 BOTH ENHANCED EARLY NEGATIVITY AND N2 COMPONENTS DURING 
RETRIEVAL SUPPRESSION PREDICTED LATER SUPPRESSION-INDUCED 
FORGETTING 
A global ANOVA with the factors Response Condition (think, no-think), Time Window 
(180-240 ms, 350-450 ms), Region (frontal, central, parietal) and Laterality (left, middle, 
right) yielded significant interactions between Response Condition, Time Window, Region, 
and Laterality, (F(4, 80) = 5.40, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .213), Response Condition, Time Window, 
and Region (F(2, 40) = 5.59, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .218), Response Condition, Time Window, and 
Laterality (F(2, 40) = 8.25, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .292). This suggests that the ERPs in both time 
windows and response conditions differed in the three regions and the three levels of the 
laterality factor. 
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors Response Condition, Region and 
Laterality performed for each time window revealed a main effect of Response Condition 
(F(1, 20) = 7.89, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .283), in the early time window (180-240 ms), reflecting an 
enhanced and broadly distributed early negativity for no-think compared to think trials.  
In the second time window (350-450 ms), follow up analyses revealed a main effect of 
response condition (F(1, 20) = 11.20, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .359) and significant interactions 
between Response Condition and Region (F(2, 40) = 6.16, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .235), Response 
Condition and Laterality (F(2, 40) = 7.74, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .279) and Response Condition, 
Region and Laterality (F(4, 80) = 5.89, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .228). 
Post-hoc analyses conducted to break down these interactions revealed significant response 
type effects at all 9 laterality by region combinations with largest effect sizes at the middle 
MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES  55 
 
(ω2 = 0.34) and right (ω2 = 0.36) central sites and smallest effect sizes at left frontal 
(ω2 = 0.13) and left central (ω2 = 0.18) recording sites.  
In a complementary analysis, we explored whether the early negativity and the N2 predicted 
individual differences in retrieval suppression. The early negativity was positively correlated 
with suppression-induced forgetting at the level of individual participants. The larger the 
amplitude differences of the early negativity between the think and no-think conditions the 
larger the suppression-induced forgetting (r = .57, p = .007). The same correlation pattern 
was obtained for the N2 difference measure (r = .48, p = .03; Figure II-3A), indicating that 
both ERP components may reflect processes relevant for suppression-induced forgetting. 
4.3 THE TRAUMATIC FILM WAS AVERSIVE AND LED TO PTSD-LIKE 
SYMPTOMS 
Participants reported that they experienced significantly more negative emotions and higher 
physiological arousal during presentation of the traumatic film as compared to the neutral 
film (negative emotions: t(23) = 11.36, p = .001, d = 2.32; arousal: (t(23) = 12.60, p = .001, 
d = 2.57).  
Furthermore, participants reported significantly more intrusive reexperiencing of the 
traumatic film than of the neutral film (traumatic: M = 4.0, SD = 2.9; neutral: M = 0.2, 
SD = 0.4; t(23) = 6.55, p = .001, d = 0.06). Critically, those intrusions associated with the 
traumatic film were rated as significantly more distressing than those associated with the 
neutral film (traumatic: M = 4.0, SD = 2.4; neutral: M = 0.0, SD = 0.0; t(23) = 8.34, p = .001, 
d = 1.95). This indicates that the traumatic film successfully induced PTSD-like intrusions. 
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Figure II-3:  Correlations between suppression-induced forgetting and analogue PTSD symptoms. 
(A) The positive correlation between suppression-induced forgetting (baseline recall – no-think recall) and the N2 
difference (N2 think – N2 no-think). (B) The negative correlation between suppression-induced forgetting and distress 
ratings for intrusive reexperiencing measured by the electronic diary. (C) The non-significant correlation between 
suppression-induced forgetting and the Impact of Event Scale -Revised (IES-R). (D) The negative correlation between the 
N2 difference and distress ratings for intrusive reexperiencing measured by the electronic diary. (E) The negative 
correlation between the N2 difference and IES-R scores. All ERP measures for the correlational analyses were taken from 
the FCz recording site. 
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4.4 BETTER RETRIEVAL SUPPRESSION ABILITY PREDICTED LOWER 
INTRUSION DISTRESS AND ANALOGUE PTSD SYMPTOMS 
In line with our hypothesis, increased suppression-induced forgetting predicted reduced 
distress for intrusive memories in the electronic diary (r = -.53, p = .008; Figure II-3B). 
However, there was not a reliable correlation between suppression-induced forgetting and 
overall intrusion frequency in the electronic diary (r = .14, p = .52) or between suppression-
induced forgetting and the IES-R score (r = -.21, p = .33; Figure II-3C).  
Paralleling the analysis of behavioral indices, we examined whether the N2, which in the 
present and in previous studies (Mecklinger et al., 2009) has been related to behavioral 
measures of retrieval suppression, predicted intrusion distress and frequency. Indeed, an 
enhanced N2 to no-think items significantly predicted reduced distress during intrusive 
memories (r = -.45, p = .04; Figure II-3D) and also reduced IES-R scores (r = -.47, p = .03; 
Figure II-3E). As for the behavioral data, there was no significant correlation between the 
N2 and overall frequency intrusions of the traumatic film (r = .08, p = .74).  
5 DISCUSSION 
Most people experience intrusive memories in the aftermath of a traumatic event. While 
intrusive memories decline for some trauma survivors, others continuously suffer from them. 
In the present study, we investigated whether deficits in the ability to suppress memory 
retrieval may be one cause for such persisting intrusions. In particular, we examined whether 
behavioral and ERP measures of retrieval suppression ability predicted individual 
differences in intrusive reexperiencing (intrusion frequency and intrusion distress) and 
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PTSD-like symptoms (as measured with the IES) after an analogue trauma. In line with our 
hypotheses, we found that behavioral and ERP correlates of retrieval suppression ability 
predicted the distress caused by intrusive memories of a traumatic film. In detail, participants 
with low retrieval suppression ability reported more distress caused by intrusive memories 
than did participants with high retrieval suppression abilities. Furthermore, individual 
differences in the N2, the ERP correlates of retrieval suppression, predicted analogue PTSD 
symptoms, as measured with the IES. Thus, our results are in line with previous findings 
linking PTSD with retrieval suppression deficits (Catarino et al., 2015) and memory control 
deficits (Zwissler et al., 2012). Extending these findings, our study is the first to show that 
deficits in retrieval suppression ability were linked to intrusive memories in a prospective 
design, indicating that pre-existing deficits in memory control ability may constitute a risk 
factor for the development of PTSD. This corresponds with recent research indicating that 
patients with PTSD show impaired response inhibition (Aupperle, Melrose, Stein, & Paulus, 
2012).  
Replicating earlier findings, retrieval suppression in the TNT task was reflected by greater 
negative going ERPs at fronto-central electrode sites. The first ERP difference between think 
and no-think trials emerged in the time window from 180-240 ms. This finding is in line 
with previous studies on retrieval suppression that found a similar early ERP difference 
between think and no-think trials (Bergström et al., 2009a; Mecklinger et al., 2009; 
Waldhauser et al., 2012). As proposed by Bergström et al. (2009a) this early effect may 
reflect the detection of the need to control memory retrieval. A possible neural generator of 
this component lies in the frontal lobe, including the right inferior frontal gyrus, as indicated 
by a recent dipole source localization study (Chen et al., 2012). Notably, in the present 
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study, differences in this time window predicted suppression-induced forgetting, meaning 
that the differential processing of think and no-think trials in this time window may be 
relevant for the effectiveness of retrieval suppression.  
We further found an N2 component between 350 and 450 ms over frontal and central 
electrodes that was enhanced for no-think items compared to think items. Replicating earlier 
findings (Mecklinger et al., 2009), differences between think and no-think items in this time 
window predicted later suppression-induced forgetting. Our findings indicate that this ERP 
component reflects processes related to active suppression of memory traces. The early 
negativity and the N2 may index different component processes of inhibitory control, such 
as detecting the need for cognitive control and the active suppression of unwanted memories 
(Bergström et al., 2009a, 2009b; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 2012).  
Building on previous research linking the N2 with retrieval suppression and motor 
suppression (Mecklinger et al., 2009), we wanted to examine whether this ERP component is 
also relevant for controlling intrusive trauma memories. Indeed, an enhanced N2 was related 
to less distressing intrusive reexperiencing and less severe analogue PTSD symptoms. This 
indicates that the N2 component not only reflects processes relevant for suppressing retrieval 
of simple word pairs in laboratory settings, as in the TNT task, but also for controlling 
unwanted memories after a real-life traumatic experience, leading to less distressing 
intrusive reexperiencing. By showing that the N2 correlated with memory control measures 
in both laboratory and more naturalistic settings, our results support the view, that retrieval 
suppression in both situations relies on the same mechanisms (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 
2014; Anderson et al., 2004; Catarino et al., 2015; Depue et al., 2007; Küpper et al., 2014).  
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Surprisingly, we did not find a reliable relationship between the reported overall frequency 
of intrusive memories of the traumatic film and either the behavioral or the ERP correlates of 
retrieval suppression in the TNT task. This finding is in line with the study of Wessel, 
Overwijk, Verwoerd, and de Vrieze (2008), who also did not find a relationship between 
retrieval suppression in the TNT paradigm and intrusion frequency after a traumatic film. 
However, this is in contrast to previous findings linking successful retrieval suppression with 
a decline of intrusions of the associated responses during the TNT task itself (Benoit et al., 
2014; Levy & Anderson, 2012). One explanation for the missing association between 
retrieval suppression and intrusion frequency in the current study relates to motivational 
issues: Our participants were not, in fact, instructed to suppress intrusive memories of the 
film, making the engagement of suppression uncertain. Anderson and Hanslmayr (2014) 
recently argued that to effectively suppress a memory, it is necessary to have a strong 
motivation to do so. In the laboratory this motivation is achieved by experimental 
instructions. In the trauma film procedure, we assumed that the negative affect of an aversive 
memory would supply motivation to engage in spontaneous suppression. However, 
participants may only have suppressed the truly distressing intrusions from the traumatic 
film, limiting the number of intrusions affected by inhibition. This may have attenuated 
distress associated with those intrusions, while making effects on intrusion frequency more 
difficult to measure. If these lines of reasoning were correct, one would predict that 
intrusions with high distress ratings (that participants would have been naturally motivated 
to suppress) would be less frequent in participants with high retrieval suppression ability 
compared to those with low retrieval suppression ability. An additional analysis examining 
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the number of highly distressing intrusions in both groups, confirmed this assumption.
3
 
Subjects with high suppression-induced forgetting scores had fewer highly distressing 
intrusions than subjects with low suppression-induced forgetting scores. A second 
explanation for the missing association is that retrieval suppression after the traumatic film 
may have primarily reduced the vividness of memories by degrading access to upsetting 
details, leaving overall access to the events intact. Indeed, Küpper et al. (2014) found that in 
a pictorial TNT task memory for details of upsetting images was reduced very effectively 
after no-think trials, even when the image itself could be recalled (see also Noreen & 
MacLeod, 2013; Stephens, Braid, & Hertel, 2013). Similarly, in the current study, even 
though intrusion frequencies did not reliably decline during our measurement period, 
effective suppression of upsetting details of the traumatic memories may have reduced 
distress. 
In summary, the present findings suggest that deficient retrieval suppression is not a 
consequence of traumatic experiences but rather a potential risk factor for the development 
of distressing intrusive reexperiencing after traumatic events. People with good retrieval 
suppression abilities had less distressing intrusions and fewer PTSD-like symptoms. As 
such, the present data support the idea that prospectively measuring and recognizing poor 
retrieval suppression may help to identify people unlikely to recover on their own after a 
traumatic event and to guide appropriate intervention approaches to prevent them from 
developing PTSD (Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009; Joormann et al., 2005; 
Peterson, Klein, Donnelly, & Renk, 2009). Indeed, if retrieval-suppression is a general 
                                                 
3
 Participants with high and low retrieval suppression ability were divided into two groups, based on a median split of 
their suppression-induced forgetting score. Subjects with high suppression-induced forgetting scores had a significantly 
reduced frequency of highly distressing intrusions (distress rating of 6 to 10) compared to subjects with low suppression-
induced forgetting scores (t(22) = 1.95, p = .03 (1-sided), d = 0.83). 
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ability that spans both laboratory and trauma settings, as indicated here, it suggests that 
training retrieval suppression with laboratory methods may be a promising method for 
improving people’s ability to cope with intrusive memories in the aftermath of trauma.  
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III CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS  
Study 2 aimed to examine the temporal stability of conditioned responses to trauma 
reminders. As conditioned associations are thought to account for the occurrence of intrusive 
trauma memories, such temporal stability is a crucial precondition. Furthermore, this study 
extends previous findings from rather artificial fear conditioning paradigms to more 
naturalistic conditions which more closely resemble the complexity of a real-life trauma and 
thus attains higher ecological validity. Following the assumption that conditioned responses 
to trauma-associated stimuli should be alleviated by imaginal exposure, a second aim of this 
study is to examine whether imaginal exposure to the traumatic event can reduce the number 
and intensity of intrusive trauma memories that are triggered by trauma-associated stimuli, 
along with conditioned physiological responses to these stimuli. In the following, the article 
based on Study 2 is presented in the original form in which it was prepared for publication 
(apart from changes in formatting). 
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STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS: HOW 
DURABLE ARE THEY OVER TIME AND DOES IMAGINAL TRAUMA EXPOSURE 
REDUCE THEM? 
Co-Authors: Martin A. Conway and Tanja Michael 
1 ABSTRACT 
Intrusive memories of traumatic events — a hallmark symptom of posttraumatic stress 
disorder — are triggered by stimuli perceptually similar to stimuli that have been 
encountered in the context of the traumatic event. Models of PTSD assume that conditioned 
associations between neutral stimuli and traumatic events play an important role in PTSD, 
and that imaginal exposure has the effect of reducing these associations. This study aims to 
examine whether conditioned associations lead to intrusive trauma memories and how they 
are affected by imaginal exposure. Forty-eight healthy females watched a neutral film and a 
traumatic film containing neutral sounds, and on the following day were randomly allocated 
to imaginal exposure to either the traumatic film (treatment condition) or the neutral film 
(control condition). Intrusive memories were monitored for one week. Participants 
repeatedly completed a memory triggering task, in order to assess how durable conditioned 
intrusive memories, anxiety, and physiological reactions (skin conductance level, heart rate) 
are over time. Trauma-associated sounds elicited intrusive memories and anxiety when 
presented directly after film presentation, as well as one and seven days later. Furthermore, 
enhanced conditionability predicted later spontaneous trauma intrusions. This study 
therefore provides evidence for the assumption that intrusive trauma memories can be 
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explained by conditioned responses to neutral stimuli encountered during the trauma and that 
these effects are stable over time. No evidence was found for conditioned physiological 
reactions or for the hypothesis that imaginal exposure has the effect of reducing conditioned 
reactions. Implications for PTSD and its treatment are discussed. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
Intrusive memories of traumatic events are a hallmark symptom of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). These memories consist of 
vividly experienced thoughts, images, and perceptions that cause immense distress (Michael, 
2000; Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). Unlike ordinary autobiographical memories, 
intrusive trauma memories are involuntarily retrieved and lack contextual information 
(Ehlers et al., 2004). Intrusive memories are triggered by stimuli perceptually similar to 
stimuli that have been encountered in the context of the traumatic event (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Foa et al., 1989). These stimuli do not necessarily have a meaningful relationship to the 
traumatic event (Ehlers et al., 2004). Furthermore, intrusive memories are often experienced 
as if they are actually happening (Hackmann et al., 2004). 
Contemporary models of PTSD assume that intrusive memories can be explained by the way 
memories of traumatic experiences are encoded, represented, and retrieved (Brewin, 2001; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989). Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) have proposed that the cue-driven retrieval of trauma memories, initiated by 
perceptually similar cues, is due to strong perceptual priming and associative learning for 
trauma-related stimuli. According to this model, temporal co-occurrence causes neutral 
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stimuli to become associated with the aversive experience of the traumatic event and 
subsequently have the potential to trigger intrusive reexperiencing of the trauma, including 
memories, emotions, and physiological arousal (see also Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 
1985). Thus, intrusive memories in PTSD can be regarded as conditioned reactions (CR) and 
triggers can be seen as conditioned stimuli (CS) that predict a traumatic event 
(unconditioned stimulus, UCS; Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 1985; Rothbaum & Davis, 
2003). Furthermore, perceptual priming is thought to lower the perceptual threshold for these 
conditioned stimuli, which increases their probability of being recognized and acting as 
triggers for conditioned reactions and cue-driven retrieval of trauma memories. 
It has been proposed that, in general, this cue-driven retrieval is inhibited as soon as episodic 
memories are integrated into the autobiographical memory system (Conway, 2005; Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This system is regarded as a representation of conceptually 
organized autobiographical knowledge, regulated by a central control process, the working 
self, which controls the retrieval and encoding of episodic memories (Conway, 2003, 2005). 
Based on this model, Ehlers and Clark (2000) have suggested that poor memory integration 
of the traumatic experience in PTSD patients leads to insufficient inhibition of cue-driven 
retrieval of trauma memories. This corresponds to findings from cognitive neuroscience 
which suggests that stress-related alterations in brain functioning are responsible for the 
uncontrolled stimulus-driven retrieval in PTSD (Brewin, 2001; Elzinga & Bremner, 2002). 
Specifically, stress leads to enhanced activation in the amygdala during the traumatic event 
(Pitman et al., 2000; Shin, Rauch, & Pitman, 2006). As the amygdala is involved in fear 
conditioning, enhanced activation reinforces the acquisition of conditioned fear reactions 
(Davis & Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 2000). On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
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interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus during high levels of stress can lead 
to reduced hippocampal functioning, which in turn leads to impaired contextual and 
relational memory representations (for reviews see Bremner et al., 1995; Lupien & Lepage, 
2001; Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998; Radley & Morrison, 2005; Sapolsky, 2004). This deficient 
contextual integration is also thought to reduce voluntary control of memory retrieval and — 
more importantly — the inhibition of automatic cue-driven memory retrieval (Brewin, 2001; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
According to this model of PTSD, memory integration should lead to a reduction of 
conditioned reactions and intrusive memories triggered by trauma-related stimuli. Indeed, 
clinical efficacy studies show that intervention techniques which focus on trauma memories 
and include a verbalization of the traumatic experience (e.g. memory elaboration or imaginal 
exposure) provide the best therapeutic outcomes (Bisson et al., 2007). It is not clear, 
however, whether this memory integration actually leads to a reduction of the memory 
processes supposedly underlying intrusive memories (i.e. perceptual priming and associative 
learning).  
The first study examining the memory mechanisms underlying the effects of trauma memory 
integration treatment was conducted by Michael and Ehlers (2007). They presented 
traumatic and neutral picture stories to healthy participants and subsequently administered 
questions designed to promote remembering the traumatic experience and integrating it into 
participants’ other autobiographical memories (e.g. whether the picture stories reminded 
them of things that had happened in their own lives). As expected, participants showed 
reduced intrusive memories after this memory elaboration as compared to a control group 
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that completed a series of cognitive tasks unrelated to the picture stories instead of the 
elaboration task. They also found that perceptual priming was reduced in the memory 
elaboration group. Using a similar design, Ehlers et al. (2012) investigated the effects of 
memory elaboration and imaginal exposure on perceptual priming, associative learning, and 
intrusive memories after traumatic picture stories. They found that both interventions were 
able to reduce the frequency of subsequent intrusive trauma memories and negative 
evaluative conditioning effects (i.e. the change in valence of a stimulus due to its paring with 
another negative or positive stimulus). Furthermore, memory elaboration also lowered 
perceptual priming effects for trauma-related stimuli. Taken together, these findings support 
the assumption that embedding the trauma memory into autobiographical memories leads to 
reduced intrusive trauma memories and that perceptual priming and associative learning are 
involved in this treatment effect. These results therefore provide evidence for the assumption 
that memory integration leads to a normalization of both the lowered perceptual threshold 
and conditioned negative evaluations for trauma-related stimuli that trigger conditioned 
reactions and trauma memories. These studies did not, however, include a direct 
measurement of conditioned reactions (e.g. intrusive memories, anxiety) to trauma-related 
stimuli, so whether associative learning is involved in the reduction of intrusive trauma 
memories after memory integration remains an open issue. 
There is growing evidence for the important role associative learning plays in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD (Duits et al., 2015). Orr et al. (2000) investigated 
fear conditioning in PTSD patients and trauma-exposed participants without PTSD using a 
differential fear conditioning paradigm. Neutral visual stimuli were used as CS and either 
paired with an electrical stimulus as UCS or not. During acquisition, PTSD patients showed 
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larger differential skin conductance (SC), heart rate (HR) and electromyogram responses to 
the CS+ (stimulus paired with the UCS) versus the CS- (stimulus not paired with the UCS) 
compared to trauma-survivors without PTSD. When CS+ and CS- were subsequently 
repeatedly presented without being followed by the UCS (extinction), only PTSD patients 
continued to show differential SC responses to CS+ versus CS-. Delayed extinction in PTSD 
patients compared to trauma-exposed or healthy control groups has also been found in larger 
heart rate responses (Peri, Ben-Shakhar, Orr, & Shalev, 2000), startle responses (Norrholm 
et al., 2011), and subjective ratings of valence and US-expectancy (Blechert et al., 2007). In 
a prospective study of soldiers who were tested before and after their deployment, reduced 
extinction learning was found to be a pre-trauma vulnerability factor for PTSD symptom 
severity (Lommen et al., 2013). Taken together, these findings indicate that conditioned 
reactions to trauma reminders play an important role for the development of intrusive 
reexperiencing.  
One limitation, however, of fear conditioning experiments is their relatively poor ecological 
validity. The UCSs implemented to simulate a traumatic event in the laboratory are electrical 
stimulation or aversive noises (Duits et al., 2015; Lissek et al., 2005). These stimuli are 
suitable for investigating conditioned fear reactions, but allow no inferences about complex 
intrusive trauma memories as they are observed after real-life trauma. Because of these 
shortcomings Wegerer et al. (2013) have recently developed the conditioned intrusion 
paradigm. In this paradigm, neutral sounds are either paired with short aversive film clips 
(CS+) or presented alone (CS-). Subsequently, the CS+ when presented again while 
embedded in a neutral background soundscape triggered intrusive memories, and induced 
anxiety and physiological arousal (as indexed by SC levels). Furthermore, conditionability of 
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subjective valence ratings and fear reactions in this task was associated with later ambulatory 
intrusive memories, which indicates that fear conditioning is involved in the development of 
intrusive trauma memories. This paradigm was an important step toward investigating fear 
conditioning in a more naturalistic laboratory setting, yet its ecological validity is still 
limited, as the repeated presentation of the CS+ paired with the UCS that is interrupted by 
inter-trial intervals and CS- presentations is quite artificial and does not resemble the typical 
time course of a traumatic event. Furthermore, conditioned intrusive memories and fear 
reactions were only assessed directly after the acquisition phase, so it remains unclear 
whether the associated responses are stable over time. 
A more naturalistic laboratory analogue of traumatic experiences is the trauma film 
paradigm. In this paradigm healthy participants are exposed to a stressful film (typical 
duration: 8-12 min), depicting traumatic events, such as actual or threatened death and 
serious physical injuries. Over the following days, participants keep a diary to document 
their intrusive memories of the presented film. Several studies verify that this paradigm can 
cause intrusive memories that are analogous to intrusive trauma memories in PTSD (for a 
review see Holmes & Bourne, 2008), so that the trauma film paradigm provides an 
experimental tool for investigating memory processes underlying PTSD with high ecological 
validity. 
In order to examine how stable conditioned responses to trauma reminders are over time, and 
how they are affected by imaginal memory exposure, we combined the conditioned 
intrusions paradigm from Wegerer et al. (2013) with the standard trauma film paradigm. 
Specifically, neutral sounds were repeatedly presented during either a traumatic film clip 
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(CS+) depicting interpersonal violence or a neutral control film (CS-) depicting neutral 
social interactions. To test whether trauma-associated sounds (CS+) trigger traumatic 
memories and increase anxiety, the memory triggering task developed by Wegerer et al. 
(2013) was performed after film presentation. To examine how durable these conditioned 
responses are over time, we implemented the memory triggering task again one day and one 
week after presenting the film. To study whether fear conditioning plays a role in the 
therapeutic effects of imaginal exposure, one day after seeing the film, participants were 
instructed to imagine and verbalize either the events of the traumatic or neutral film, 
following Ehlers’ (1999) rational for imaginal exposure. 
Our design has the advantage of using the well-established standard trauma film paradigm 
that is known to reliably induce analogue trauma intrusions and allows experimental control 
of which neutral stimuli are present during the analogue trauma, as in a fear conditioning 
paradigm. It therefore enables the investigation of associative learning during traumatic 
events in one of the most natural ways possible. Additionally, by having participants 
repeatedly perform the memory triggering task after the traumatic film, we are able to assess 
whether conditioned intrusive memories remain stable over a longer time span and how they 
are impacted by the therapeutic intervention of imaginal exposure. 
This experimental analogue study had two main aims: (1) Investigating associative learning 
for intrusive memories and conditioned fear in a traumatic context and (2) testing whether 
associative learning processes are involved in the therapeutic effects of imaginal exposure on 
subsequent intrusive trauma memories. The following hypotheses were examined: 
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Hypothesis 1: It was expected that neutral sound stimuli repeatedly presented during a 
traumatic film (CS+), would lead, when presented again in a neutral context, to more 
intense intrusive memories, more anxiety, and greater physiological arousal (as indexed 
by enhanced skin conductance levels and heart rates) as compared to neutral stimuli that 
were originally presented during a neutral film (CS-). This effect was expected to be 
observed directly after film presentation (t1), on the following day (t2, t3), and one week 
after film presentation (t4). 
Hypothesis 2: Furthermore, enhanced conditionability, as assessed by differential 
conditioned reactions (CS+ minus CS-) directly after film presentation (t1), was expected 
to predict the intensity of subsequent ambulatory intrusive trauma memories and Impact 
of Event Scale (IES-R) scores.  
Hypothesis 3: Imaginal exposure to the traumatic film was expected to reduce the 
differential conditioning effects (CS+ minus CS-) on intrusive memories, anxiety, and 
physiological arousal directly after imaginal exposure (t3) and six days later (t4) as 
compared to imaginal exposure to the neutral film.  
Hypothesis 4: Furthermore, imaginal exposure to the traumatic film was expected to lead 
to reduced spontaneous intrusive memories on subsequent days and reduced IES-R 
scores as compared to imaginal exposure to the neutral film. 
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3 METHOD 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Forty-eight female non-psychology students (mean age: 23.8, range 19-34 years) were 
recruited on the campus of Saarland University and participated in exchange for 56 Euros. 
Only female participants were included because of gender differences in affective self-
reports and physiological responses to emotional stimuli (Bianchin & Angrilli, 2012; 
Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Kring & Gordon, 1998), and because the 
prevalence of PTSD is higher among women (Perkonigg et al., 2000). All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision, were native German speakers, reported no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders or past traumatic experience, and gave informed 
consent. The research was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee of 
Saarland University. 
3.2 ANALOGUE TRAUMA AND INTRUSION CONDITIONING 
All participants saw two film clips (one neutral and one traumatic) in pseudo-randomized 
order. The neutral film was a compilation of neutral scenes (11 min) from the movie “Three 
Colors: Blue” directed by Krzysztof Kieslowski (1993). The traumatic film consisted of 
neutral and violent scenes (11 min) from the movie “Irreversible” by Gaspar Noé (2002). 
During presentation of each film clip one of two neutral sounds with a duration of 5 s (sound 
A: clock ticking, sound B: sound of a passing train) was presented every minute (11 times) 
to serve as conditioned stimuli (CS; see Figure III-1). The CS sounds were assigned to CS+ 
(i.e., sound that was presented during the aversive film clip and serves as danger signal) and 
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CS- (i.e., sound that was presented during the neutral film clip and served as safety signal), 
pseudo-randomized across participants. After watching each film clip, an adapted version of 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was administered, 
assessing how participants felt while watching the preceding film. Participants were 
subsequently asked to rate how strongly the preceding film caused physiological arousal on a 
5-point scale going from “very slightly or not at all” to “extremely”. 
3.3 MEMORY TRIGGERING TASK 
The memory triggering task was designed to simulate situations of everyday life in which 
trauma survivors experience intrusive memories that are triggered by CSs (Wegerer et al., 
2013). Following a 1 min physiological baseline measurement, participants were informed 
that they would then be presented with a background soundscape via headphones while they 
let their mind wander freely.  
The soundscapes were of 3 min duration and featured various people talking with neither 
content nor language identifiable. In the CS+ cue condition, the CS+ sound (clock ticking or 
train passing) was faded in six times with 5 s duration during sound-scape presentation (see 
Figure III-1). In the CS- cue condition, the CS- sound was faded in six times with 5 s 
duration. In the no-cue condition, no sound cues were faded in. In both the CS+ and the CS- 
cue conditions, sound cues were presented subtly but perceptibly at the same points in time 
(at 15 s, 45 s, 75 s, 105 s, 135 s, 165 s from soundscape onset). The order of cue conditions 
was counterbalanced across participants (including all six permutations).  
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Figure III-1:  Schematic depiction of the conditioned-intrusions paradigm.  
(A) Intrusion conditioning procedure with traumatic and neutral film scenes as unconditioned stimuli (UCS) and neutral 
sounds as conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS-). (B) Memory triggering task. Neutral soundscape with faded in CS+ sounds 
(CS+ cue condition) CS- sounds (CS- cue condition), or no additional sound faded in (no-cue condition); IMQ: Intrusive 
Memory Questionnaire; STAI-S: STAI state anxiety scale. (modified from Wegerer et al., 2013) 
Following each 3 min soundscape presentation, participants filled in the STAI state 
questionnaire (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981) and the Intrusive Memory 
Questionnaire (IMQ; Ehring, Fuchs, & Kläsener, 2009; Michael, 2000; Zetsche, Ehring, & 
Ehlers, 2009). The IMQ was adapted to assess frequency and duration (in seconds) as well as 
distress (visual analogue scale going from “0 = not at all” to “100 = extremely”) during the 
preceding soundscape. Intrusions were defined as spontaneous involuntary memories that 
could include thoughts, pictures, noises, and emotions. Participants first completed the IMQ 
with regard to intrusive memories of the traumatic film. To make sure that only trauma-
related memories were included in this assessment, the IMQ was subsequently administered 
Intrusion conditioning procedure 
Memory triggering task  
CS+ cue condition 
Neutral soundscape 
CS- cue condition 
Neutral soundscape 
No-cue condition 
Neutral soundscape 
A 
B 
CS+ Sound 
CS- Sound 
Traumatic film Neutral film 
CS+ Sound 
CS- Sound 
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again with regard to neutral memories. Only the version assessing trauma-related memories 
was used for data analysis. To obtain a more reliable score for intrusive trauma memories, 
we additionally calculated an index of intrusive trauma memories by building a composite 
score of the IMQ by standardizing (z-transformation) and summing all single items for the 
traumatic film (For purposes of better illustration the composite scores were transformed 
into T-scores.) 
The three soundscapes from the memory triggering task were presented before film 
presentation (t0) without subsequent questionnaires to habituate participants to the stimuli 
and to examine potential pre-experimental differences between the cue conditions. The 
memory triggering task was assessed at four different measurement points in time (see 
Figure III-2): (t1) after film presentation, (t2) before imaginal exposure (one day after film 
presentation), (t3) after imaginal exposure, (t4) at follow-up session (one week after film 
presentation).  
3.4 IMAGINAL EXPOSURE 
On the day following film presentation, participants were asked to imagine and verbalize one 
of the two previously seen film clips (neutral or traumatic). The treatment group was asked 
to imagine the traumatic film and the control group was asked to imagine the neutral film. 
The instructions were modeled on imaginal exposure (Ehlers, 1999). Participants were asked 
to close their eyes and imagine the respective film clip as vividly as they could. Participants 
were encouraged to remember as much detail as possible and recall their original feelings 
and thoughts. They were asked to remember the action of the film in chronological order. 
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The exposure lasted from 3 to 20 min (M = 7.98, SD = 3.59). The imaginal exposure session 
was audio recorded and each participant was rated by two independent persons regarding 
how well they followed the instructions on a rating scale going from 1 to 10 (inter-rater 
reliability: r = .70, p < .001). Participants had an average compliance score of M = 6.66 
(SD = 1.33), indicating that they had followed the instructions. 
3.5 ASSESSMENT OF AMBULATORY INTRUSIVE MEMORIES AND THE IMPACT 
OF EVENT SCALE 
During the seven days following film presentation, participants documented every intrusive 
film memory, using an iPod Touch (4th gen., Apple Inc., Cupertino, USA) running Forms 
VI (Pendragon Software Corporation, Chicago, USA). The frequency of intrusive memories 
was determined by summing up their frequency for the neutral and the traumatic film 
separately. For each memory, participants stated its duration (in seconds) and rated how 
distressing it was on a 10-point scale going from “not at all” to “extremely”. These ratings 
were averaged for the neutral and the traumatic film separately (Michael & Ehlers, 2007; 
Pfaltz et al., 2013). 
Seven days after film presentation, every participant completed the Impact of Event Scale 
(IES-R; German translation; Maercker & Schützwohl, 1998; Weiss et al., 2004), a 22-item 
questionnaire assessing PTSD symptoms. Every item (e.g. “Things I saw or heard suddenly 
reminded me of it”) was rated on a 5-point scale spanning from “not at all” to “extremely”. 
The instructions of IES-R were adapted to assess only symptoms relating to the traumatic 
film. 
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3.6 PROCEDURE 
The study took place at the laboratories of the Department of Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy of the Saarland University. Participation included three appointments: film 
presentation session (day 1), imaginal exposure session (day 2), and follow-up session (day 
8; see Figure III-2). Participants were assigned randomly to one of the two imaginal 
exposure conditions (treatment condition with imaginal exposure to the traumatic film or 
control condition with imaginal exposure to the neutral film).  
 
Figure III-2:  Study design overview.  
All participants watched a traumatic and a neutral film including neutral sounds. During the memory triggering task (MTT) 
the neutral sounds from the film were presented again to trigger intrusive memories and conditioned fear. It was 
administered at four points of measurement (t1: after film presentation, t2: one day after film exposure, before Imaginal 
exposure, t3: after imaginal exposure, t4: one week after film exposure). On the following day, participants were 
instructed to imagine and verbalize either the traumatic film (treatment condition) or the neutral film (control condition). 
One week after film presentation, participants completed the Impact of Event Scale (IES-R). Participants documented 
every intrusive memory during the week following film exposure (intrusion diary). 
Film presentation session (Day 1). After their arrival at the laboratories, participants were 
led to the experiment room, and electrodes for physiological measurements 
(electrocardiogram, skin conductance) were attached (as described in detail in: III3.7 
Apparatus and Physiological Recording). Participants were subsequently presented with the 
Day 1 
Film presentation 
(traumatic and neutral) 
Imaginal exposure 
(traumatic or neutral) 
MTT (t1) MTT (t2) 
Day 2 
MTT (t3) MTT (t4) 
Day 8 
IES-R 
Intrusion diary 
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three soundscapes of the memory triggering task (t0; CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, 
no-cue condition). This was done in order to assess whether the three conditions had pre-
experimental differences in their potential to trigger physiological reactions. Afterwards, 
each participant saw the two film clips (neutral and traumatic). After presentation of both 
film clips, participants completed the first run of the memory triggering task (t1) to assess 
conditioned reactions to the film-associated sounds directly after the films. Participants were 
reminded to record spontaneous intrusive memories with the electronic diary during the 
following week before they left the laboratory. 
Imaginal exposure session (Day 2). On the following day, participants returned to the 
laboratory. Electrodes for physiological measurements were again attached, and participants 
completed the second run of the memory triggering task (t2) to determine whether 
conditioned reactions to the film-associated sounds were still present one day after film 
exposure. Afterwards, they were instructed to complete an imaginal exposure either to the 
traumatic film (treatment condition) or to the neutral film (control condition). After the 
imaginal exposure, participants completed the third run of the memory triggering task (t3) to 
examine the immediate effects of imaginal exposure on conditioned reactions to the film-
associated sounds and left the laboratory. 
Follow-up session (Day 8). Seven days after film presentation, participants returned to the 
laboratory for the last time. They turned in the electronic diary, electrodes for physiological 
measurements were again attached, and they completed a final run of the memory triggering 
task (t4) to see whether conditioned reactions to the film-associated sounds were still 
observable one week after film presentation. Afterwards, participants completed an adapted 
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version of the IES-R, received 56 Euros for their participation, and were offered to ask 
questions about the design and goals of the study. 
3.7 APPARATUS AND PHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDING 
Participants were seated in an electrically shielded room. Stimulus presentation and 
behavioral data acquisition were controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Pittsburg, PA, USA). Acoustic stimuli were presented via shielded headphones at a 
constant volume across participants. To measure heart rate, a standard lead-II 
electrocardiogram (ECG) with two Ag/AgCl electrodes was used to collect a raw ECG 
signal with an ActiveTwo amplifier (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) at a sampling 
rate of 2048 Hz. R-waves were identified automatically by ANSLAB (Wilhelm and Peyk, 
2012) and edited manually for artifacts, false positives or non-recognized R-waves and 
transformed into instantaneous heart rates (HR). To measure skin conductance levels (SCL), 
two Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with isotonic electrode gel were attached to the proximal part 
of the palm of the participants’ non-dominant hand (with an alternating current of 1 mA 
synchronized with the sampling frequency passed between the electrodes). The raw signal of 
electrodermal activity was cautiously collected using an ActiveTwo amplifier (BioSemi, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands) at a sampling rate of 2048 Hz and decimated to 25 Hz before 
further analysis. It was then manually edited for artifacts, smoothed using a 1 Hz low-pass 
filter.  
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3.8 STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Memory triggering task. For each run of the memory triggering task (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4), 
mean SCL and HR were calculated as the average across the whole phase (3 min) of each 
condition (CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, no-cue condition). Before the actual 
experiment, a habituation phase (t0) was completed, additionally examining potential pre-
experimental differences in physiological reactions to the three cue conditions. No such 
differences were observed (see Table III-3).  
To examine the differential conditioning effects on intrusive memories and state anxiety, 
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were calculated separately for each point 
of measurement (t1, t2, t3, t4
4
) and each outcome measure (IMQ, STAI state anxiety) with 
the cue condition as the within-participant factor (CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, no-
cue condition). To examine the differential conditioning effects on physiological measures, 
repeated measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were calculated separately for each 
point of measurement (t1, t2, t3, t4
4
) and each outcome measure (HR, SCL) with cue 
condition as the within-participant factor (CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, no-cue 
condition). To account for baseline differences, the respective physiological baseline 
measurement was included as a covariate. 
Individual estimates of conditionability were calculated as the differential reaction to CS+ 
versus CS- separately for each outcome measure (IMQ, STAI state anxiety, HR, SCL) of the 
                                                 
4
 As the two experimental groups (treatment group, control group) did not differ at point of measurement t3 and t4 with 
regard to all outcome variables of the MTT, the data of both groups were collapsed for this analysis. 
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MTT directly after film presentation (t1). These indices of conditionability were correlated 
with subsequent ambulatory intrusions (frequency, duration, distress) and the IES-R score.
5
 
Individual t-tests examined differences between the treatment condition and the control 
condition in the differential conditioning scores (CS+ minus CS-) of each outcome measure 
(IMQ, STAI state anxiety, HR, SCL) separately for the two post-treatment points of 
measurement (t3, t4). 
Ambulatory intrusive memories and Impact of Event Scale. Individual t-tests were used 
to examine differences between the treatment condition and the control condition in the 
frequency of intrusive trauma memories after imaginal exposure, as well as their duration 
and distress ratings. A t-test was used to compare the IES-R scores of the treatment 
condition and the control condition. 
The alpha level for all analyses was set to .05 and significant main or interaction effects of 
ANOVAs were further explored using t-tests. For all ANOVAs and t-tests, effects sizes are 
reported partial eta squared (ηp²) or Cohen’s d, respectively. When the sphericity assumption 
was violated in ANOVAs, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for repeated measures was 
applied with nominal degrees of freedom being reported. Due to missing values, degrees of 
freedom varied across analyses. 
All statistical analyses were calculated using IBM SPSS Statistics 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, 
NY, USA). 
                                                 
5
 As the two experimental groups (treatment group, control group) did not differ at day 7 with regard to IES-R scores, the 
data of both groups were collapsed for this analysis. 
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 VALIDITY OF THE FILM MATERIAL  
Participants reported significantly more negative emotions and higher subjective 
physiological arousal during presentation of the traumatic film as compared to the neutral 
film (see Table III-1). Participants also showed significantly enhanced physiological arousal 
as indexed by elevated skin conductance levels (SCL) and heart rate (HR) during 
presentation of the traumatic film as compared to the neutral film (see Table III-1).  
Table III-1:  Emotional and physiological reactions to the two film clips and ambulatory intrusive memories of the film 
clips. 
 Reactions to the film clips 
 Traumatic film Neutral film Interferential statistics 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 
PANAS – Positive
 
11.72 (4.86) 9.74 (5.27) t(46) = 2.47, p < .05, d = 0.36 
PANAS – Negative
 
24.02 (7.73) 5.60 (5.31) t(46) = 14.99, p < .001, d = 2.19 
Subjective arousal
 
2.35 (1.06) 0.73 (0.89) t(47) = 10.78, p < .001, d = 1.56 
SCL
 
8.865 (0.861) 8.690 (0.817) t(43) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.62 
HR
 
77.01 (13.69) 72.07 (11.58) t(42) = 4.78, p < .001, d = 0.73 
Note: PANAS – Positive: PANAS score for positive affect; PANAS – Negative: PANAS score for negative affect; Subjective 
arousal: subjective arousal rating after film presentation (“To what extent did the film cause physiological reactions (faster 
heartbeat, sweating etc.)?”, scale 0 – 100; 0 = not at all, 100 = extremely); SCL: skin conductance level given as ln(1 + SCL) 
in μS; HR: heart rate given as beats per minute. 
4.2 VALIDITY OF IMAGINAL EXPOSURE 
During the first three minutes of imaginal exposure, the treatment group showed marginally 
significant elevated skin conductance levels as compared to the control group (see Table 
III-2). The treatment group furthermore showed significantly elevated heart rates as 
compared to the control group. This indicates enhanced physiological arousal in the 
treatment group as a reaction to remembering the trauma memories when compared to the 
CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS  85 
 
group that remembered the neutral film. Furthermore, duration and compliance ratings for 
the treatment group were higher than for the control group (see Table III-2). 
Table III-2:  Physiological reactions, duration, and compliance for imaginal exposure. 
 Imaginal exposure 
 
Treatment group  
(trauma exposure) 
Control group  
(neutral exposure) 
Interferential statistics 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 
SCL
 
2.361 (0.696) 2.067 (0.564) t(43) = 1.73, p = .09, d = 0.51 
HR
 
90.77 (17.76) 83.62 (14.36) t(42) = 2.90, p = .006, d = 2.90 
Duration 532.73 (151.19) 393.71 (101.28) t(46) = 3.74, p = .001, d = 1.10 
Compliance score 7.29 (1.28)  6.04 (1.09) t(46) = 3.63, p = 001., d = 1.07 
Note: SCL: skin conductance level given as ln(1 + SCL) in μS; HR: heart rate given as beats per minute; Interferential 
statistics for baseline-corrected measures; Duration: duration of exposure session given as seconds; Compliance score: 
averaged score from two independent persons rating how well participants followed the instructions (scale: 1 - 10) . 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS 1: CONDITIONED INTRUSIVE MEMORIES AND CONDITIONED 
FEAR 
Intrusive Memory Questionnaire. As expected, responses to the IMQ (including subjective 
intrusive trauma memory frequency and duration as well as distress through intrusive trauma 
memories) differed significantly by condition in the memory triggering task, comprised of 
neutral soundscapes with CS+, CS-, or no faded in sound cues at all points of measurement 
(t1: post-film, t2: pre-treatment, t3: post-treatment, t4: follow-up; see Table III-3). As the 
planned comparisons revealed, at all points of measurement participants reported more 
numerous, longer, and more distressing memories of the traumatic film during the CS+ cue 
condition as compared to the CS- and the no-cue condition (all ts(47) > 2.06, ps < .05, 
ds > 0.60; see Table III-3). The CS- cue condition, in turn, did not differ from the no-cue 
condition with regard to frequency, duration, or level of distress of memories of the 
traumatic film at all points of measurement (all ts(47) < 1.30, ps > .20, ds < 0.38; see Table 
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III-3). This means that participants showed differential conditioning effects for conditioned 
trauma memories and that these effects were still observable one day and one week after film 
presentation. 
State anxiety. As expected, STAI state anxiety differed significantly by condition in the 
memory triggering task at all points of measurement (t1, t2, t3, t4; see Table III-3). As 
planned comparisons revealed, participants reported more state anxiety during the CS+ 
condition than during the CS- and the no-cue condition for all points of measurement (all 
ts(47) > 2.78, ps < .03, ds > 0.81; see Table III-3). The CS- cue condition, in turn, did not 
differ from the no-cue condition with regard to state anxiety at all points of measurement (all 
ts(47) < 1.68, ps > .10, ds < 0.49; see Table III-3). This means that participants showed 
differential conditioning effects for state anxiety and that these effects were still observable 
one day and one week after film presentation. 
Skin conductance level. Contrary to our hypothesis, no significant differences between the 
three cue conditions (CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, no-cue condition) in SCL 
during the memory triggering task were observed at all points of measurement (see Table 
III-3). These findings indicate that, counter to our hypothesis, no differential conditioning 
effects for skin conductance level were present. 
Heart rate. Contrary to our hypothesis, no significant differences between the three cue 
conditions (CS+ cue condition, CS- cue condition, no-cue condition) in HR during the 
memory triggering task were observed for all points of measurement (see Table III-3). These 
findings indicate that, counter to our hypothesis, no differential conditioning effects for heart 
rate were present. 
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Table III-3:  Results from intrusive memories, state anxiety, SCL, and HR during the memory triggering task after film 
presentation (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4). 
 Memory triggering task  
 CS+ condition CS- condition No-cue condition Interferential statistics 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Day 1: Physiological baseline measurement (t0) 
SCL 1.68 (0.71) 1.65 (0.69) 1.67 (0.73) F(2, 90) = 0.64, p = .53, ηp
2
 = .01 
HR
 
73.82 (10.95) 74.03 (11.44) 73.87 (11.32) F(1.6, 72.4) = 0.93, p = .40, ηp
2
 = .02 
     
Post-film measurement (t1) 
IMQ – Score 75.12 (30.40)
a 
58.92 (21.44)
b
 56.88 (24.12)
b
 F(2, 94) = 15.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .25 
    IMQ - Frequency 4.49 (2.91)
a
 2.77 (2.09)
b
 2.56 (2.56)
b
 F(2, 94) = 17.57, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .27 
    IMQ - Duration 26.61 (39.83)
a
 9.32 (18.00)
b
 7.35 (18.64)
b
 F(1.5, 71.0) = 12.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .22 
    IMQ - Distress 36.77 (30.24)
a
 18.79 (25.03)
b
 19.31 (24.58)
b
 F(2, 94) = 3.96, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .08 
State anxiety 48.21 (13.90)
a
 45.02 (13.16)
b
 44.54 (11.88)
b
 F(1.7, 78.5) = 8.53, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .15 
SCL 2.11 (0.71) 2.11 (0.73) 2.12 (0.71) F(2, 86) = 1.69, p = .19, ηp
2
 = .04 
HR
 
71.76 (10.71) 71.85 (10.61) 72.88 (11.17) F(2, 90) = 0.17, p = .85, ηp
2
 = .01 
     
Day 2: Pre-treatment measurement (t2) 
IMQ – Score 62.55 (29.30)
a
 41.96 (18.04)
b
 40.13 (16.67)
b
 F(2, 94) = 29.36, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .39 
    IMQ - Frequency 3.28 (2.70)
a
 1.40 (1.62)
b
 1.10 (1.39)
b
 F(1.6, 76.6) = 26.43, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .36 
    IMQ - Duration 32.39 (46.19)
a
 15.14 (46.19)
b
 13.83 (28.21)
b
 F(1.5, 71.0) = 12.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .22 
    IMQ - Distress 36.77 (30.24)
a
 18.79. (25.03)
b
 19.31 (24.58)
b
 F(2, 94) = 15.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24 
State anxiety 40.23 (12.18)
a
 36.08 (10.04)
b
 35.81 (9.70)
b
 F(1.3, 62.5) = 10.98, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .19 
SCL 1.61 (0.74) 1.62 (0.69) 1.60 (0.69) F(2, 90) = 0.93, p = .40, ηp
2
 = .02 
HR
 
78.46 (13.62) 77.85 (13.60) 78.03 (13.62) F(2, 92) = 0.02, p = .99, ηp
2
 < .01 
     
Post-treatment measurement (t3) 
IMQ – Score 61.62 (25.83)
a
 46.44 (19.44)
b
 45.09 (20.71)
b
 F(1.7, 81.9) = 21.42, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .31 
    IMQ - Frequency 3.08 (2.09)
a
 1.78 (1.79)
b
 1.46 (1.53)
b
 F(2, 94) = 16.44, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26 
    IMQ - Duration 26.85 (36.05)
a
 9.60 (16.98)
b
 12.35 (28.89)
b
 F(1.5, 69.7) = 15.49, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .25 
    IMQ - Distress 36.35 (31.54)
a
 26.75 (30.04)
b
 24.06 (25.37)
b
 F(2, 94) = 6.88, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .13 
State anxiety 42.25 (11.50)
a
 39.92 (11.24)
b
 38.81 (10.93)
b
 F(1.8, 83.5) = 9.39, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17 
SCL 2.11 (0.72) 2.09 (0.73) 2.09 (0.74) F(2, 90) = 0.27, p = .76, ηp
2
 = .01 
HR
 
74.67 (12.35) 74.37 (12.85) 75.09 (12.57) F(1.3, 60.9) = 0.81, p = .45, ηp
2
 = .02 
     
Day 7: Follow-up measurement (t4) 
IMQ – Score 45.27 (16.32)
a
 32.70 (9.01)
b
 33.32 (10.18)
b
 F(1.7, 78.1) = 22.68, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .33 
    IMQ - Frequency 2.21 (1.95)
a
 0.81 (1.28)
b
 0.67 (0.97)
b
 F(1.4, 67.5) = 27.91, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .37 
    IMQ - Duration 9.15 (11.52)
a
 2.23 (3.47)
b
 3.19 (5.15)
b
 F(1.3, 60.2) = 14.73, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24 
    IMQ - Distress 18.13 (23.73)
a
 6.50 (12.94)
b
 9.25 (19.39)
b
 F(2, 94) = 6.94, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .13 
State anxiety 35.71 (10.97)
a
 33.77 (9.82)
b
 33.96 (9.11)
b
 F(1.4, 66.6) = 4.74, p < 05., ηp
2
 = .92 
SCL 1.47 (0.64) 1.45 (0.65) 1.48 (0.64) F(2, 98) = 0.46, p = .63, ηp
2
 = .01 
HR
 
77.10 (12.28) 76.71 (12.12) 76.49 (12.22) F(1.8, 77.4) = 0.18, p = .83, ηp
2
 < .01 
Note: IMQ Score: composite scores of the IMQ in T-scores; state anxiety: assessed by STAI state; SCL: skin conductance 
level given as ln(1 + SCL) in μS; HR: heart rate given as beats per minute. As the two experimental groups (treatment 
group, control group) did not differ at point of measurement t3 and t4, data from both groups were collapsed for this 
analysis. a, b, different superscripts indicate that the conditions differed from each other at p < .05 in post hoc tests. 
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4.4 HYPOTHESIS 2: CONDITIONABILITY AND AMBULATORY INTRUSIVE 
MEMORIES 
To examine whether conditionability of intrusive memories (IMQ), state anxiety (STAI-S), 
and physiological arousal (SCL, HR) can predict later intrusive trauma memories and IES-R 
scores, conditionability scores were calculated (CS+ minus CS-) separately for each 
variable.  
Conditionability of intrusive memories (IMQ) was significantly correlated with the 
frequency, duration, and distress of subsequent ambulatory trauma intrusions (all rs > .33, 
ps < .05; see Table III-4), indicating that the specific conditioned reactions to trauma-
associated cues (CS+) were predictive of later intrusive memories in everyday life.  
No correlations, however, were observed for conditionability of state anxiety and 
physiological arousal (SCL, HR), or for the IES-R scores (see Table III-4).  
Table III-4:  Correlations between conditionability (as indexed by differential effects on IMQ, STAI-S, HR, SCL) and 
ambulatory intrusive trauma memories and IES-R scores. 
 Ambulatory intrusive trauma memories  Impact of Event Scale 
 Frequency Duration Distress  IES-R score 
 r (p) r (p) r (p)  r (p) 
Conditionability (CS+ minus CS-) 
IMQ – Score .39 (.006) .33 (.02) .46 (.001)  .18 (.22) 
State anxiety .12 (.42) -.03 (.84) .22 (.13)  .23 (.11) 
SCL -.02 (.92) -.12 (.42) .02 (.92)  -.10 (.54) 
HR
 
.09 (.54) .08 (.58) .12 (.41)  .11 (.45) 
Note: All scores constitute differential conditioning scores (CS+ minus CS-) from the memory triggering task; IMQ Score: 
composite scores of the intrusive memory questionnaire for trauma intrusions in T-scores; state anxiety: assessed by STAI 
state anxiety scale; SCL: skin conductance level given as ln(1 + SCL) in μS; HR: heart rate given as beats per minute.  
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4.5 HYPOTHESIS 3: EFFECTS OF IMAGINAL EXPOSURE ON CONDITIONED 
INTRUSIVE MEMORIES AND FEAR 
Contrary to our hypotheses, the two exposure conditions did not differ with regard to 
differential conditioning effects for the IMQ (composite score, frequency, duration, and 
distress of traumatic intrusions), STAI-S, SCL, or HR at both points of measurement after 
imaginal exposure (t3, t4; see Table III-5).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that in this study imaginal exposure to the traumatic 
film had no beneficial effects on differential conditioning as compared to imaginal exposure 
to the neutral film. 
4.6 HYPOTHESIS 4: EFFECTS OF IMAGINAL EXPOSURE ON AMBULATORY 
INTRUSIVE MEMORIES AND IES-R SCORES 
Counter to our hypothesis, the treatment group did not differ with regard to ambulatory 
intrusive trauma memories (assessed with electronic diary) when compared to the control 
group (see Table III-6). Furthermore, no significant difference between the two treatment 
groups was found in the Impact of Event Scale score and its subscales (see Table III-6).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that in this study, imaginal exposure to the traumatic 
film had no beneficial effects on intrusive trauma memories and the impact of the traumatic 
film as compared to imaginal exposure to the neutral film. 
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Table III-5:  Group differences in differential conditioning scores of intrusive memories, state anxiety, SCL, and HR 
during the memory triggering task before (t2) and after imaginal exposure (t3, t4). 
 Differential conditioning in the memory triggering task  
 
Treatment group  
(trauma exposure) 
Control group  
(neutral exposure) 
Interferential statistics 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Day 2:  
Pre-treatment measurement (t2) 
IMQ – Score 20.70 (30.93) 20.48 (17.64) t(36.5) = 0.03, p = .98, d = 0.01 
    IMQ  - Frequency 1.77 (2.75) 2.00 (1.62) t(46) = 0.35, p = .73, d = 0.10 
    IMQ - Duration 22.08 (45.50) 12.50 (16.61) t(29.0) = 0.97, p = .34, d = 0.36 
    IMQ - Distress 14.71 (27.89) 21.25 (26.09) t(46) = 0.84, p = .41, d = 0.24 
State anxiety 3.58 (5.68) 4.71 (10.56) t(46) = 0.46, p = .65, d = 0.14 
SCL -0.02 (0.30) -0.01 (0.19) t(46) = 0.19, p = .85, d = 0.06 
HR
 
0.73 (3.18) 0.50 (2.73) t(46) = 0.26, p = .79, d = 0.08 
    
Post-treatment measurement (t3) 
IMQ – Score 15.91 (25.59) 14.44 (16.46) t(46) = 0.24, p = .81, d = 0.07 
    IMQ - Frequency 1.15 (2.57) 1.46 (2.13) t(46) = 0.46, p = .65, d = 0.14 
    IMQ - Duration 23.33 (34.39) 11.17 (12.86) t(29.3) = 1.62, p = .11, d = 0.60 
    IMQ - Distress 7.38 (28.23) 11.83 (21.28) t(46) = 0.62, p = .54, d = 0.18 
State anxiety 1.83 (7.18) 2.83 (4.16) t(36.9) = 0.59, p = .56, d = 0.19 
SCL 0.005 (0.13) 0.043 (0.17) t(45) = 0.86, p = .40, d = 0.26 
HR
 
-0.53 (2.15) 1.13 (8.68) t(46) = 0.91, p = .37, d = 0.27 
    
Day 7:  
Follow-up measurement (t4) 
IMQ – Score 12.22 (18.53) 12.92 (15.32) t(46) = 0.14, p = .89, d = 0.04 
    IMQ - Frequency 1.38 (2.16) 1.42 (1.35) t(46) = 0.08, p = .94, d = 0.02 
    IMQ - Duration 7.50 (13.63) 6.33 (11.03) t(46) = 0.33, p = .75, d = 0.10 
    IMQ - Distress 10.25 (22.18) 13.00 (27.71) t(46) = 0.38, p = .71, d = 0.11 
State anxiety 1.13 (4.10) 2.75 (7.11) t(46) = 0.97, p = .34, d = 0.29 
SCL -0.007 (0.19) 0.058 (0.183) t(44) = 1.19, p = .24, d = 0.36 
HR
 
0.61 (1.96) 0.16 (3.00) t(44) = 0.61, p = .55, d = 0.18 
Note: All scores constitute differential conditioning scores (CS+ minus CS-) from the memory triggering task; IMQ Score: 
composite scores of the intrusive memory questionnaire for trauma intrusions in T-scores; IMQ Frequency: number of 
intrusive memories; IMQ duration: duration of intrusive memories; IMQ distress: distress elicited by intrusive memories; 
state anxiety: assessed by STAI state anxiety scale; SCL: skin conductance level given as ln(1 + SCL) in μS; HR: heart rate 
given as beats per minute.  
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Table III-6:  Results for ambulatory intrusive memories and the Impact of Event Scale (IES-R) for treatment and control 
group separately. 
 ANOVA 
 
Treatment group  
(trauma exposure) 
Control group  
(neutral exposure) 
Interferential statistics 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Pre-treatment ambulatory trauma intrusions 
    Frequency 3.88 (4.48) 3.96 (4.88) t(46) = 0.06, p = .95, d = 0.02 
    Duration 245.54 (899.50) 118.58 (179.92) t(46) = 0.68, p = .50, d = 0.20 
    Distress 3.90 (2.42) 4.18 (2.94) t(46) = 0.37, p = .72, d = 0.11 
    
Post-treatment ambulatory trauma intrusions 
    Frequency 5.08 (5.44) 4.08 (4.42) t(46) = 0.70, p = .49, d = 0.21 
    Duration 335.42 (984.49) 145.08 (390.59) t(46) = 0.88, p = .38, d = 0.26 
    Distress 2.92 (2.36) 3.04 (2.20) t(46) = 0.18, p = .86, d = 0.05 
    
Impact of Event Scale (IES-R) 
IES-R score -3.33 (0.85) -3.39 (0.85) t(46) = 0.23, p = .82, d = 0.07 
    Intrusions 9.67 (6.50) 8.54 (5.09) t(46) = 0.67, p = .51, d = 0.19 
    Hyperarousal 2.96 (3.01) 3.29 (3.67) t(46) = 0.34, p = .73, d = 0.10 
    Avoidance 11.08 (8.11) 9.26 (7.73) t(46) = 0.80, p = .43, d = 0.23 
Note: Frequency: frequency of intrusive memories; Duration: subjective duration of intrusive memories; Distress: distress-
rating for intrusive memories; IES-R-Score: Values represent diagnostic values according to the following formula: IES-
R Score = -0.02 × Intrusions + 0.07 × Avoidance + 0.15 × Hyperarousal – 4.36 by Maercker and Schützwohl (1998).  
5 DISCUSSION 
This study reveals that associative learning contributes to spontaneous intrusive memories 
after an analogue trauma. Our findings support the assumption that conditioned associations 
between neutral stimuli and traumatic events play an important role in the development of 
intrusive memories of trauma. We found no evidence for the hypothesis that the effects of 
imaginal exposure work to reduce these associations. From a methodological perspective, we 
made it possible to study associative learning in the standard trauma film paradigm by 
experimentally controlling neutral sound stimuli (CSs) encountered during film presentation 
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(UCS). These sound stimuli subsequently elicited intrusive memories and anxiety when 
presented again after film presentation, but also when presented again one or seven days 
after film presentation. Our work therefore opens up new possibilities for studying triggers 
of intrusive memories of trauma, which could enhance our understanding of PTSD.  
In line with hypothesis 1, intrusive memories and state anxiety were highest when trauma-
associated sound cues were presented during a neutral background soundscape (CS+ cue 
condition) as compared to the same soundscape when sound cues associated with a neutral 
film (CS- cue condition) or no additional sound cues (no-cue condition) were presented. Our 
findings therefore are in line with a previous fear conditioning study, which demonstrated 
that presenting acoustic, conditioned trauma reminders during a neutral background 
soundscape can trigger intrusive memories and anxiety (Wegerer et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
the pattern of results observed was not only found directly after film presentation (t1), but 
remained stable until the following day (t2, t3) and was still present seven days after film 
presentation (t4). It is clear that conditioned stimuli retain their potential to trigger intrusive 
memories and anxiety for a timespan of at least one week, which is a very important 
extension of previous findings, as Wegerer et al. (2013) only investigated conditioned 
memories and state anxiety directly after the conditioning procedure. The observed temporal 
stability of conditioning effects is in line with contemporary models of PTSD proposing that 
intrusive memories can be explained by associative learning processes (Brewin, 2001; Ehlers 
& Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 1985; Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). Only if 
conditioned reactions to trauma reminders are temporally stable, can they account for 
intrusive memories that recur stable over several months or even years, as it is typically 
reported in PTSD patients. 
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Surprisingly, peripheral physiological indicators of arousal (SCL, HR) during the memory 
triggering task did not confirm hypothesis 1. SCL and HR for the three cue conditions did 
not differ significantly at any point of measurement (t1, t2, t3, t4). Both groups showed 
significantly enhanced physiological parameters during the traumatic film clip as compared 
to the neutral film clip. During the memory triggering task, however, no significant 
differences were observed, indicating that, when presented again in a neutral context (CS+ 
cue condition), trauma-associated stimuli did not lead to enhanced physiological arousal as 
compared to neutral-associated stimuli (CS- cue condition) or the neutral context alone (no-
cue condition). This stands in contrast to a number of previous studies showing enhanced 
physiological reactivity to trauma reminders in trauma exposed participants (for a review see 
Pole, 2007). Nevertheless, our findings are partly in line with the findings of Wegerer et al. 
(2013), who used the same memory triggering task in a fear conditioning paradigm. They 
also found no SCL differences between the CS+ cue condition and the CS- condition, as well 
as no differences between the CS- and the no-cue condition. In contrast to our results, 
however, they reported significant differences in SCL between the CS+ and the no-cue 
condition, indicating that trauma-associated stimuli led to increased physiological arousal. 
The absence of this effect in the current study may be due to lower contingency of the CS+, 
as the CS+ stimuli were presented once per minute during the film clips and did not take the 
timing of the events depicted into account. This may have reduced the strength of 
conditioned physiological fear reactions as compared to the fear conditioning paradigm used 
in the study by Wegerer et al. (2013). Future studies should improve contingency for neutral 
stimuli in the trauma film paradigm by presenting the CS+ sounds immediately preceding 
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the most aversive moments of a traumatic film, which would increase the likelihood of 
conditioned fear reactions with regard to physiological parameters, as well. 
In line with hypothesis 2, the conditionability of intrusive memories (as indexed by the IMQ) 
was correlated with the frequency, duration, and distress of subsequent ambulatory trauma 
intrusions (assessed by means of the electronic diary): participants who acquired stronger 
differential conditioned intrusive trauma memories were more likely to experience 
ambulatory intrusive trauma memories on the days following the analogue trauma. This 
finding indicates that the conditionability of intrusive memories is related to the spontaneous 
occurrence of such memories, underlining the important role of conditioned reactions in the 
development of intrusive memories of trauma. No correlations, however, were observed for 
conditionability of state anxiety and physiological arousal, which may again be due to 
limited contingency caused by relatively low temporal precision and separation of the CSs 
and UCSs (see above). Furthermore, no significant correlations between indices of 
conditionability and the IES-R scores were observed. As the IES-R originally was 
constructed to assess the impact of real-life trauma, interindividual variance in our sample of 
healthy participants was limited. As a certain degree of variance is needed to find 
correlations, the low variation in IES-R scores in the current study may have led to the non-
significant correlation.  
Contrary to hypothesis 3, the treatment group showed neither a stronger reduction of 
intrusive trauma memories nor reduced state anxiety in the memory triggering task after 
imaginal exposure as compared to the control group. These findings indicate that imaginal 
exposure in our study had no influence on conditioned reactions to trauma-associated 
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stimuli. This is counter to current models of PTSD, which assume that imaginal exposure 
should reduce conditioned reaction to trauma reminders (Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 1985; Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). As conditioned 
intrusive trauma memories and anxiety were still observable one week after film 
presentation, the acquired associations may have been too robust to be impacted by a single 
imaginal exposure session. In the treatment of PTSD, patients usually receive multiple 
sessions including imaginal exposure (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 
2005), and the intervention in our study may have been too weak to cause any effects on 
associated responses. Future studies should examine whether implementing more sessions of 
imaginal exposure leads to significant reductions in conditioned trauma responses.  
In contrast to hypothesis 4, the treatment group showed no reduction in ambulatory intrusive 
trauma memories on the days following imaginal exposure as compared to the control group. 
This is in contrast to findings from clinical samples showing that therapeutic interventions, 
including imaginal exposure, show significant reductions in PTSD symptoms (Bisson et al., 
2007) and especially intrusive memories (Hackmann et al., 2004; Speckens, Ehlers, 
Hackmann, & Clark, 2006). As there was a relatively fast decline in intrusive trauma 
memories for both groups on the days following film presentation, floor effects may account 
for these findings. On the days following exposure sessions, participants in both groups had 
already reported fairly low numbers of intrusions, which may have allowed no further 
improvement through imaginal exposure. Furthermore, the treatment group did not have 
significantly reduced IES-R scores as compared to the control group. This may be due to the 
broad time-window covered by the questionnaire: subjects were asked to complete the IES-R 
with regard to the whole week following the trauma film, so the initial reactions to the film 
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may have disguised potential beneficial effects in the treatment group. The IES-R may index 
the initial reaction to the trauma film rather than differential effects of the imaginal exposure. 
Future studies should therefore more carefully separate initial reactions to the trauma film 
from reactions to imaginal exposure for example by instructing participants to complete the 
IES-R solely with regard to the days following imaginal exposure or by separating film 
presentation and imaginal exposure by a longer period of time.  
Another explanation for the missing effects of imaginal exposure may be found in the 
relatively short assessment period of intrusive memories and PTSD symptoms after the 
imaginal exposure. As in clinical samples, intrusive memories usually decrease only 
gradually over several weeks following imaginal exposure (Ehlers et al., 2005; Hackmann et 
al., 2004; Speckens et al., 2006). Indeed, the only analogue study showing a reduction of 
intrusive memories by imaginal exposure also assessed intrusive memories over a longer 
period of time (one month after imaginal exposure) as compared to the current study 
(Michael & Ehlers, 2007). Thus, future studies investigating the effects of imaginal exposure 
should examine intrusive memories for longer periods of time.  
Yet another reason for the missing effects of imaginal exposure could be due to a potential 
side effect of the memory triggering task. The MTT was modeled to simulate an everyday-
life situation in which trauma reminders are encountered and trigger intrusive memories 
(Wegerer et al., 2013), however, as participants in the MTT were confronted with the CS+ 
without a following UCS, it could also be regarded as an extinction learning phase. 
According to this view, before our actual intervention, participants would already have 
passed through two sessions of extinction learning. Some interventions for PTSD suggest 
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that exposing PTSD patients to trauma reminders promotes extinction of conditioned 
responses to these stimuli (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2005), so that repeatedly 
presenting CS+ stimuli during the MTT may have fostered extinction learning and overlaid 
the therapeutic effects of the imaginal exposure in our study. Assessing the MTT solely at 
follow up session could circumvent this shortcoming in future studies.  
One limitation of our study is that we used an analogue design, so that it is not clear to what 
extent our results can be transferred to traumatic events in real life. Even though the film 
used in our study was very aversive, it is still a relatively mild stressor compared to 
traumatic events. Hence, the intrusive memories reported by our participants are not 
equivalent to intrusive memories after real-life trauma. As well, the frequency of intrusive 
memories in our sample was fairly small when compared to trauma exposed samples 
(Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, et al., 2005). With regard to intrusive memories, there may be 
only limited room for improvement in analogue trauma studies such as ours. Exposing 
participants to stronger stressors should, of course, lead to more intrusive memories, but 
ethical considerations set inevitable limits on the intensity of laboratory stressors.  
A further limitation of the current study is that the sample was comprised of women only. 
We decided to include only women for several reasons: first, previous studies have observed 
significant gender differences in affective self-reports and physiological responses to 
emotional stimuli (Bianchin & Angrilli, 2012; Bradley et al., 2001; Kring & Gordon, 1998), 
so that including both genders would have added systematic variance to our outcome 
measures. Second, the prevalence of PTSD is higher among women (Perkonigg et al., 2000), 
so we expected the traumatic film clip to have a larger impact on women than on men. As 
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we were interested in the memory processes underlying PTSD and its intervention methods 
and not in gender differences in this study, we decided on a study that only included women. 
Future studies should extend our findings to both genders. 
In summary, our experiment demonstrated that presenting neutral sound stimuli during a 
traumatic film leads to conditioned intrusive responses to these stimuli that remain stable 
over a time period of at least one week. Furthermore, the conditionability of intrusive trauma 
memories predicted later spontaneous intrusions of trauma memories. Our study therefore 
provides evidence for the assumption that intrusive trauma memories can at least partially be 
explained by conditioned responses to neutral stimuli that have been encountered during the 
trauma, however, no evidence was found for the hypothesis that imaginal trauma exposure 
has the effect of reducing these associations. Future research should further examine the role 
of associative learning for imaginal exposure to promote enhancements of this clinical 
intervention for PTSD patients. 
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IV GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The global aim of this thesis was to examine the mechanisms underlying intrusive memories 
after traumatic events. As recent findings suggest that deficits in the ability to voluntarily 
inhibit memory retrieval are related to PTSD symptom severity (Catarino et al., 2015), the 
studies included in this work tested whether deficits in retrieval suppression constitute a 
potential cognitive risk factor that leads to an increase in intrusive memories after traumatic 
events. Furthermore, these studies investigated whether the same neural process that 
mediates retrieval suppression (Mecklinger et al., 2009) is also associated with fewer trauma 
memories.  
Since current research indicates that conditioned responses to trauma reminders are 
associated with intrusive trauma memories (Wegerer et al., 2013), another aim of this thesis 
was to further examine the role of these conditioned responses in the development and 
maintenance of intrusive trauma memories. Specifically, the temporal stability of 
conditioned reactions was investigated. An additional aim of this thesis was to test whether 
conditioned responses are reduced after imaginal exposure, as has been suggested by current 
models of PTSD (Brewin, 2014; Ehlers, 2015).  
In what follows, I will first give a short summary of the research questions and 
interpretations of both studies. Next, I will discuss the results from the broader perspective 
of current memory models and models of PTSD. Further on, I will consider limitations and 
caveats of the studies conducted and provide an outlook and directions for future research. 
Finally, I will summarize the major findings and end with concluding remarks.  
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1 SUMMARY 
1.1 STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES 
Study 1 was designed to test whether pre-existing deficits in memory control constitute a 
potential cognitive risk factor for intrusive memories after traumatic events, and whether the 
neural processes underlying memory control are also involved in controlling intrusive 
trauma memories. Suppression-induced forgetting, our index of memory control, was found 
to be predictive of subjective distress experienced during intrusive memories of a traumatic 
film. Furthermore, the neural correlate of the inhibitory control process which is supposed to 
underlie suppression-induced forgetting (i.e. N2 ERP component) also predicted a reduction 
in the degree of distress of intrusive memories, as well as a reduction in other analogue 
PTSD symptoms. These findings indicate that the pre-existing ability to suppress memory 
retrieval is beneficial for recovering from intrusive memories after traumatic events. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the same inhibitory control process that was found to 
mediate retrieval suppression and stopping a prepotent motor response is also involved in 
controlling the automatic retrieval of intrusive trauma memories.  
1.2 STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
Study 2 aimed to investigate whether conditioned responses to trauma-associated stimuli are 
stable over time and whether they are affected by imaginal exposure. Indeed, intrusive 
memories and subjective fear as a reaction to trauma-associated stimuli were observed and 
remained stable over the entire assessment period of one week, providing further evidence 
for the assumption that associative learning plays a crucial role in the development and 
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maintenance of intrusive memories after traumatic events. Furthermore, conditionability of 
subjective indices did predict subsequent ambulatory intrusive memories, however, 
physiological parameters assessing emotional arousal as a reaction to the trauma reminders 
did not show these effects. Moreover, imaginal exposure had no impact on conditioned 
responses to trauma-associated stimuli or intrusive trauma memories.  
2 DISCUSSION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CURRENT MODELS IN THE 
FIELD 
The findings of the two studies have already been discussed in chapters II and III. I will next 
consider the results of both studies more broadly with regard to contemporary memory 
models and models of PTSD. 
2.1 STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES 
In replication of earlier findings, retrieval suppression in the TNT task led to a decline in the 
cued recall of suppressed words (no-think condition) relative to previously studied but not 
additionally processed words (baseline condition). Furthermore, it was also possible to 
replicate the ERP components previously observed to mediate retrieval suppression (i.e. 
early negativity, N2; Bergström et al., 2009a; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 
2012). In this study, differences in N2 predicted suppression-induced forgetting, an 
extension of previous results. Our findings indicate that these ERP components reflect 
inhibitory control processes, such as detecting the need for cognitive control and the active 
suppression of unwanted memories, so they are in line with inhibitory control accounts of 
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suppression-induced forgetting (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; 
Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Anderson et al., 2004). 
2.1.1 ERP CORRELATES OF RETRIEVAL INHIBITION 
In Study 1, attempts to suppress memory retrieval in the think/no-think task were reflected 
by greater negative going ERP amplitudes at fronto-central electrode sites. In line with 
previous findings (Bergström et al., 2009a; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 
2012), the first ERP difference between think and no-think trials occurred in the time 
window from 180-240 ms. Bergström et al. (2009a) found that differences in this component 
predicted interindividual differences in suppression-induced forgetting, which indicates that 
it resembles a process involved in inhibiting the memory trace. The second ERP difference 
was an N2 component from 350-450 ms that was enhanced for no-think items as compared 
to think items, which also corresponds to earlier studies (Bergström et al., 2009b; Bergström 
et al., 2007; Depue et al., 2007; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 2012). 
Differences between think and no-think items in the N2 predicted later suppression-induced 
forgetting, replicating findings from Mecklinger et al. (2009). Furthermore, Mecklinger et al. 
(2009) found that this N2 component was correlated with the N2 elicited by stopping a 
prepotent motor response, indicating that it may resemble a general inhibitory control 
mechanism. Prior work using a motor stopping task has suggested that the neural generator 
of the N2 is located in the prefrontal cortex: ventral and dorsolateral PFC (Lavric, Pizzagalli, 
& Forstmeier, 2004) or right inferior frontal gyrus (Chen et al., 2012). This is in line with 
brain areas found to be involved in inhibition of a prepotent motor response (Aron, Robbins, 
& Poldrack, 2004) and in retrieval suppression (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). 
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Previous studies have found that retrieval suppression is also accompanied by a significant 
reduction in the parietal episodic memory effect between 500 and 600 ms (Bergström et al., 
2009a; Bergström et al., 2007; Hanslmayr, Leipold, Pastotter, & Bauml, 2009; Mecklinger et 
al., 2009). Since this component is thought to reflect conscious recollection in reaction to a 
memory cue (Rugg & Curran, 2007), it’s reduction is most likely to reflect a down-
regulation of recollection activity in the hippocampal-parietal network as a consequence of 
successful suppression (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Depue et al., 2007). More convincing 
evidence for this effect is that it only occurs when participants suppress the memory directly, 
instead of using thought substitution (i.e. retrieving another associated stimulus) as a strategy 
to avoid remembering the target (Bergström et al., 2009a). As modulations in the parietal 
episodic memory effect have not predicted successful retrieval suppression in previous 
studies (Bergström et al., 2007; Hanslmayr, Leipold, & Bauml, 2010), and as we were 
especially interested in inhibitory control processes underlying retrieval suppression, the 
parietal episodic memory component was not included in the analysis of this study. 
Taken together, the ERP data from Study 1 support previous findings on ERP correlates of 
inhibitory control processes potentially underlying suppression-induced forgetting effects. 
Early negativity and N2 may index different processes relevant for retrieval suppression, 
such as detecting the need for cognitive control and the active suppression of unwanted 
memories, whereas the reduction of the parietal episodic memory effect most likely 
resembles the consequence of successful retrieval inhibition (Bergström et al., 2009a, 2009b; 
Mecklinger et al., 2009; Waldhauser et al., 2012).  
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2.1.2 EFFECTS OF ATTENTION AND ENCODING 
The think/no-think task was specifically designed to examine the effects of suppressing 
memory retrieval and thus carefully separated suppression of memory retrieval from 
potential inhibitory processes during encoding (Anderson & Green, 2001). While this 
separation is relatively easy to manage for neutral stimuli, several effects need to be 
considered regarding emotionally arousing stimuli. As emotional stimuli affect attention and 
motivation, the way they are encoded differs from the encoding of neutral stimuli (Pessoa, 
2009; Vuilleumier, 2005). Even though, in general, emotional stimuli attract attention and 
are preferentially encoded (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), complex emotional stimuli as in the 
traumatic film of Study 1 may have more complex effects on encoding. Due to the 
aversiveness of the traumatic film, participants may have been motivated to distract their 
attention from the events depicted in the film. To minimize such effects, participants were 
instructed to watch the film with their full attention and to keep their gaze focused on the 
screen for the entire presentation time (which was controlled for by video surveillance), 
some participants may nevertheless have removed their attention from the film’s scenes, 
which could have impaired memory encoding of the traumatic film. Additionally, 
participants may also have engaged memory control processes which disrupted memory 
encoding of the traumatic film, as investigated by means of directed forgetting paradigms 
(see section I-4.1; for a review see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). A disruption to memory 
encoding of the traumatic film could also have contributed to the observed reduction in the 
impact of intrusive trauma memories in Study 1. In line with this account, PTSD patients 
have been found to show reduced directed forgetting effects as compared to other trauma 
survivors, indicating that they are less able to inhibit encoding of unwanted memories 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  106 
 
(Cottencin et al., 2006; Zwissler et al., 2012). It is not clear, however, whether the same 
control process is involved in suppressing both the encoding and retrieval of unwanted 
memories. If the same inhibitory control process underlies both phenomena, as proposed in 
the flexible control hypothesis (Anderson, 2005), this process may also be involved in 
suppressing memory recall of intrusive trauma memories. The suppression of traumatic 
memories may therefore be achieved by an inhibitory control process affecting both 
encoding and retrieval of traumatic events.  
2.1.3 INTERFERENCE ACCOUNTS OF SUPPRESSION-INDUCED FORGETTING 
An alternative explanation for the results of Study 1 is provided by interference accounts of 
suppression-induced forgetting (Tomlinson et al., 2009). This approach is based on the 
“Search of Associative Memory” (SAM) model of recall (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), 
assuming that memory recall consists of two stages: a sampling stage that locates (or 
samples) the memory, and a recovery stage that actually retrieves the memory. Tomlinson et 
al. (2009) proposed that interference during the recovery stage may account for retrieval 
suppression without the necessity for an inhibitory control mechanism actively suppressing 
the memory trace. According to this view, when a no-think cue is presented, in some trials 
the target will automatically be sampled and this incomplete representation will then be 
associated with the new response “sitting quietly”. This newly learned association between 
the incomplete memory representation and “sitting quietly” will interfere with the previously 
learned association between the incomplete representation and the recovery of the complete 
memory. This two stage model can explain why suppression-induced forgetting also occurs 
when the target is cued with an independent cue (i.e. a cue that has not been learned 
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previously), which is usually taken as strong evidence for an inhibitory control process 
actively suppressing the memory trace of the target (Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson et al., 2004). If transferred to retrieval suppression of intrusive 
trauma memories, the interference account would indicate that the memory trace of the 
traumatic event itself is not suppressed, but rather that there is interference from newly 
learned associations to potential trauma-reminders. 
Contrary to the interference account, recent neuroimaging findings indicate that, activity in 
prefrontal control areas (e.g. dlPFC) leads to a downregulation of hippocampal activity 
during suppression (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain et al., 2014) and that this reduced 
hippocampal activity predicts subsequent suppression-induced forgetting effects (Depue et 
al., 2007; Levy & Anderson, 2012). These findings can hardly be explained by the 
interference account, as the interfering memory trace would also require hippocampal 
activity, thus making the observed below baseline down-regulation of the hippocampus 
during no-think trials very unlikely. 
Furthermore, ERP findings also contradict the interference account: as previous studies have 
indicated, the enhanced N2 elicited by no-think trials is very likely to reflect an inhibitory 
control process that actively suppresses the memory trace (Bergström et al., 2009a; 
Mecklinger et al., 2009). Bergström et al. (2009a) observed significant ERP differences in 
the time window of the N2 only when no-think items were directly suppressed, as compared 
to using thought substitution as a strategy to avoid remembering the target word. This 
indicates that the N2 reflects a control process which is relatively independent of 
interference, as it was not enhanced during thought substitution which should have promoted 
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interference. Furthermore, in another study, the no-think N2 was associated with the N2 
elicited when a prepotent motor response is inhibited (Mecklinger et al., 2009), underlining 
the interpretation that the N2 reflects an inhibitory control process. 
Taken together, the interference account does offer a plausible alternative explanation for the 
behavioral suppression-induced forgetting effect observed in Study 1, however, the ERP 
findings support the assumption that the underlying mechanism of this effect is an inhibitory 
control process that is reflected by the N2.  
2.1.4 RESEARCH ON THOUGHT SUPPRESSION 
Another approach to investigating whether we can keep unwanted thoughts out of our minds 
has tested the effects of thought suppression. Studies investigating thought suppression 
usually examine whether participants can suppress a single target thought over an extended 
period of time (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In a typical 
thought suppression paradigm, participants are instructed to spend 5 min excluding all 
thoughts about a particular target (e.g. white bears) from awareness, while thinking about 
what they wish (i.e. suppression period). Additionally, participants are told to ring a bell 
every time they happen to think of the target anyway. After this 5 min period, participants 
are told that for the next 5 minutes they are allowed to think of anything, including the 
target, and again ring a bell every time they think about the target (i.e. expression period). 
Researchers have generally observed that thought suppression leads to a reduced frequency 
of thoughts about the target as compared to the expression period, but does not eliminate the 
thought completely. Furthermore, in the expression period following the suppression period, 
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the frequency of thoughts about the target is typically increased, even when compared to an 
expression period that was not preceded by a suppression period (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et 
al., 1987; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). A common interpretation of these effects is that 
attempts to suppress the unwanted thought cause a rebound in its occurrence, thus indicating 
that thought suppression is counterproductive.  
At first glance, these results seem to contradict findings from retrieval suppression, however, 
a central difference between the two phenomena is that the thought suppression paradigm 
explicitly refers to a specific forbidden thought that must be suppressed. This task is 
therefore somewhat paradoxical as, in order to accomplish it, participants need to keep in 
mind the target they are not supposed to think about. On the other hand, in retrieval 
suppression paradigms, participants are instructed not to think about a target associated with 
a certain cue word, so that there is no need to keep in mind what the target was in order to 
accomplish this task, thus making retrieval suppression possible. In line with this, there is 
growing evidence for successful retrieval suppression (see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). 
2.1.5 EFFECTS OF EMOTION REGULATION 
In Study 1, behavioral and ERP estimates of retrieval-suppression predicted the distress 
experienced during ambulatory trauma intrusions, however, no significant correlation with 
the frequency of intrusive trauma memories was observed. Several plausible explanations for 
this pattern of results, including motivational issues, have already been discussed above (see 
section II-5). 
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Nevertheless, previous findings from research on emotion regulation could also account for 
these findings. To investigate emotion regulation, for example, Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and 
Gabrieli (2002) presented participants with negatively valenced pictures and either instructed 
them to focus on their natural feelings (i.e. attend condition) or to reinterpret the picture in a 
less negative way (i.e. reappraisal condition). They found that reappraising the pictures led 
to a decrease in negative affect as compared to the attend condition. Furthermore, during 
reappraisal trials, activity in the dlPFC was enhanced while activity in the amygdala was 
decreased as compared to the attend condition. Similarly, several neuro imaging findings 
indicate that during the regulation of emotion, activity in the prefrontal cortex (e.g. dlPFC, 
ACC) is typically enhanced, whereas activity in the amygdala is reduced (for reviews see 
Frank et al., 2014; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, and Phelps (2008), 
using a fear conditioning paradigm, found that emotion regulation led to reduced fear 
responses, as indicated by reduced SCRs. Furthermore, the brain imaging findings indicate 
that the dlPFC down-regulates amygdala activity through connections to vmPFC regions. As 
several studies show engagement of the dlPFC during retrieval suppression (Anderson et al., 
2004; Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Depue et al., 2007), emotion regulation and suppression-
induced forgetting may be achieved by the same cognitive control process. Banich and 
Depue (2015) have recently discussed this issue and concluded that several areas in the right 
hemisphere play a critical role in inhibitory control. Whether the specific process varies with 
the domain that is inhibited — motoric, memory, or emotional — remains an open question 
(Banich & Depue, 2015). Hence in Study 1, the same control process that is involved in 
retrieval suppression may also have led to the reduction of distress during intrusive 
memories by down-regulating the associated emotions, thus causing the observed 
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correlations between behavioral and ERP estimates of retrieval-suppression and distress 
during intrusive trauma memories. Further research is needed to examine whether the same 
control process is relevant for both domains. 
2.1.6 RETRIEVAL SUPPRESSION AND MEMORY ELABORATION 
Recent brain imaging findings indicate that a certain degree of reactivation of an unwanted 
memory is necessary for successfully suppressing it: in a study using the TNT task, 
participants rated to what extend an unwanted memory entered awareness for every 
suppression trial. Stronger reduction of hippocampal activity was observed in those no-think 
trials when the cue triggered retrieval of its associated target as compared to those trials 
when no memory intruded (Levy & Anderson, 2012). Furthermore, the hippocampal down-
regulation predicted later forgetting only in those trials when an unwanted memory entered 
awareness, suggesting that a memory trace needs to be reactivated in order to suppress it. 
Similarly, Depue et al. (2007) have reported that during the first attempts to suppress an 
unwanted memory, enhanced activity in the hippocampus was observed for no-think items 
that were subsequently successfully forgotten as compared to no-think items that were 
subsequently remembered (for similar results see Detre, Natarajan, Gershman, & Norman, 
2013), supporting the idea that memories, when reactivated, are in a labile state that allows 
modifications (Lee, 2009; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Memories that are more activated 
initially may become better elaborated and thus susceptible to cognitive control mechanisms 
(Depue et al., 2007). This corresponds to the frequent clinical observation that reactivating 
traumatic memories leads to a reduction of intrusive reexperiencing (Brewin, 2014; Ehlers, 
2015). Indeed, treatment approaches involving voluntary memory retrieval of the traumatic 
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event show the best therapeutic outcomes (see section I-6; Bisson et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 
2005; Cloitre, 2009; Ehlers et al., 2010; Seidler & Wagner, 2006; Van Etten & Taylor, 1998; 
for contradictory resuts see Benish et al., 2008). Examining how such a reactivation of the 
trauma memory affects intrusive memories is one of the aims of Study 2 (see chapter III). 
2.2 STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
Study 2 aimed to investigate whether conditioned responses to trauma-associated stimuli are 
stable over time and whether they are affected by imaginal exposure. Intrusive memories and 
subjective fear, as a reaction to trauma-associated stimuli, were, indeed, observed and 
largely remained stable over the entire assessment period of one week, providing further 
evidence for the assumption that associative learning plays a crucial role in the development 
and maintenance of intrusive memories after traumatic events. Furthermore, subjective 
indexes of conditionability predicted subsequent ambulatory intrusive memories, however, 
physiological parameters assessing emotional arousal as a reaction to the trauma reminders 
did not show these effects. Moreover, imaginal exposure had no impact on conditioned 
responses to trauma-associated stimuli or intrusive trauma memories.  
2.2.1 CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
Conditioning models of PTSD assume that neutral stimuli which happen to be present during 
a traumatic event, acquire the potential to trigger conditioned responses, such as fear, 
physiological arousal, and intrusive memories, through temporal contiguity (Brewin, 2001, 
2014; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Keane et al., 1985; Rothbaum & Davis, 2003). 
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In line with these models, presenting acoustic conditioned trauma reminders against a neutral 
background soundscape triggered intrusive memories and anxiety. Furthermore, these 
findings indicate that conditioned stimuli retain their potential to trigger intrusive memories 
and anxiety for a timespan of at least one week. This observed temporal stability of 
conditioning effects is a crucial requirement for conditioning models of PTSD, as temporal 
stability of intrusive memories is typical for this disorder. Indeed, intrusive memories of the 
traumatic event can occur even after several months or years. Additional support for 
conditioning models of PTSD comes from the finding in this study that conditionability was 
correlated with subsequent ambulatory trauma intrusions.  
Another explanation for the effects observed comes from cognitive neuroscience research on 
episodic memory, especially on pattern separation (Kheirbek, Klemenhagen, Sahay, & Hen, 
2012): When we encounter stimuli that bear a similarity to previously encoded memories, 
two opposing processes are believed to determine whether the two episodes are kept separate 
or the previous memory is retrieved: pattern separation and pattern completion. Pattern 
separation is defined as a process creating separate memory representations for similar 
experiences to prevent interference, whereas pattern completion is the reconstruction of 
previously stored memory representations from similar inputs (Colgin, Moser, & Moser, 
2008; Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 2008; Treves & Rolls, 1994). Several studies have indicated 
that neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus, a section of the hippocampus, involved in memory 
formation and retrieval, mediates pattern separation (Bakker, Kirwan, Miller, & Stark, 2008; 
Lacy, Yassa, Stark, Muftuler, & Stark, 2011; Rolls, 2013; Sahay, Wilson, & Hen, 2011). If 
pattern separation is impaired (e.g. through stress during a traumatic event), this would lead 
to enhanced generalization so that sensory inputs bearing a resemblance to representations of 
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the trauma memory could trigger these traumatic memories (Kheirbek et al., 2012; Sahay et 
al., 2011). Thus, in Study 2, stress experienced during the traumatic film may have led to 
impaired pattern separation, so that the trauma-associated sounds, encountered during the 
memory triggering task, may not have been separated from representations in memory of the 
traumatic film, leading to pattern completion (i.e. episodic retrieval) of these memories 
(Kheirbek et al., 2012; Sahay et al., 2011). Furthermore, deficient pattern separation could 
also account for the observed positive correlation between conditionability (i.e. the 
difference between traumatic memories triggered by the CS+ and CS- sounds) and 
ambulatory intrusive trauma memories, as participants who show deficient pattern separation 
for CS+ items in the memory triggering task should also be more likely to experience 
intrusive memories when encountering trauma reminders in everyday life. Pattern separation 
therefore offers an alternative account for explaining the findings observed.  
The two explanations, however, are not mutually exclusive, as pattern separation has 
recently also been taken into account when explaining stimulus generalization in fear 
conditioning paradigms (Lissek et al., 2014). According to the neural framework of fear 
conditioning from Lissek et al. (2014), representations of potential triggers in the sensory 
cortex undergo a schematic matching assessment by the hippocampus, in which they are 
compared to the CS+ (see also Otto & Eichenbaum, 1992; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 
2005). If this overlap is relatively small, the patterns of the two representations will be 
separated by the hippocampus, leading to activation of fear inhibiting areas (e.g. vmPFC). If 
the degree of overlap is relatively high, the hippocampus will complete the pattern of brain 
activity representing the CS+, leading to enhanced activation of fear excitation areas (e.g. 
amygdala, anterior insula, dACC, and dmPFC). In line with findings from Study 2, pattern 
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separation in the hippocampus seems to be a relevant process for both episodic memory 
retrieval and fear conditioning. To conclude, the memory processes described above may act 
in concert in the development and maintenance of intrusive trauma memories.  
2.2.2 IMAGINAL EXPOSURE 
In contradiction to our hypotheses, imaginal exposure led neither to reductions in 
conditioned responses to trauma reminders nor to reductions in ambulatory intrusive trauma 
memories, indicating that imaginal exposure in Study 2 had no significant influence on 
conditioned reactions to trauma-associated stimuli. As conditioned intrusive trauma 
memories and anxiety were still observable one week after film presentation, the acquired 
associations may have been too robust to be impacted by a single imaginal exposure session.  
According to Conway’s model of the autobiographical memory system, incorporating 
traumatic episodic memories into the autobiographical knowledge base should have 
facilitated the inhibition of automatic retrieval triggered by associated memory cues 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In PTSD patients, however, this 
elaboration seems to fail, preventing appropriate control of the automatic retrieval of trauma 
memories (Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). From this perspective, imaginal exposure 
to traumatic memories should have led to an integration of these episodic memories and, in 
turn, should allow the central control process — the working self — to control their retrieval. 
This was not, however, the case in Study 2, as imaginal trauma exposure did not lead to a 
reduction in trauma memories, which indicates that the traumatic memories may have failed 
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to be incorporated into the autobiographical knowledge base, which suggests that imaginal 
exposure may not have activated the relevant episodic memories.  
Alternatively, considering the relative mildness of the trauma film when compared to real-
life trauma, memory integration of the traumatic film may not have been impaired in the first 
place, so that the working self may have been able to control the retrieval of intrusive 
memories after a relatively short time. This is in line with the relatively quick decline of 
intrusive trauma memories observed in Study 2, so the intervention may have brought no 
additional benefit. Working against this account, however, is the finding that intrusive 
memories and anxiety as a reaction to trauma-associated stimuli were still present one week 
after film presentation. The role of memory integration for conditioned trauma memories 
therefore remains unclear. 
In order to keep the two experimental conditions in Study 2 as similar as possible, the 
control condition also included an imaginal exposure session, but of the neutral film. This 
approach allowed the exclusion of potential effects of recalling a particular memory or 
effects of the social interaction with the experimenter, which means the only difference 
between the two conditions was the memory content retrieved during imaginal exposure. 
However, remembering the neutral film presented in close temporal connection to the 
traumatic film may inadvertently also have promoted memory integration. Even though 
participants in this condition were instructed to remember only the neutral film, they may 
have remembered the traumatic film as well, contrary to instructions. Even though none of 
the participants in the control group reported that they remembered the trauma film during 
this phase, this possibility cannot be ruled out with certainty. Comparing imaginal exposure 
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to the traumatic film with a differently designed control group, however, may help to gain 
further insights into the effects of imaginal exposure.  
Although in Study 2 imaginal exposure to the traumatic film had no beneficial effects on 
conditioned or spontaneous intrusive trauma memories, this should not be interpreted as 
general ineffectiveness of imaginal exposure as an intervention technique for PTSD. To the 
contrary, several meta-analyses indicate that trauma-focused treatment approaches as 
TFCBT or EMDR show the best outcomes for PTSD (Bisson et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 
2005; Cloitre, 2009; Ehlers et al., 2010; Seidler & Wagner, 2006; Van Etten & Taylor, 
1998), however, the underlying memory mechanism remains unclear. 
3 LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS 
Although both studies presented in this thesis provide important insights toward a better 
understanding of the memory processes underlying intrusive memories of traumatic events, 
there are some limitations that need to be considered.  
3.1 TRAUMA FILM PARADIGM 
In recent years, the trauma film paradigm has proven to be one of the most realistic 
laboratory analogues of traumatic events and in many previous studies has successfully 
induced analogue PTSD symptoms, such as intrusive memories (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). 
It remains unclear, however, to what extent findings from studies using the trauma film 
paradigm can be transferred to real-life traumatic events that meet the diagnostic criteria of 
the DSM-5 (see Appendix, Table VI-1; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
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Accordingly, the intrusive memories reported by our participants do not resemble the 
intensity and vividness of intrusive memories in PTSD. Even though we presented film 
footage that was rated as very aversive and which has been able to induce intrusive 
memories in previous studies (Nixon et al., 2007; Qin et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2010; 
Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009), these stimulus materials still 
constitute a relatively mild stressor as compared to a real-life trauma. Ethical considerations 
inevitably set limits on the intensity of laboratory stressors. 
3.2 ASSESSMENT OF INTRUSIVE MEMORIES 
Assessing ambulatory intrusive memories with an electronic diary also leads to certain 
disadvantages. Because participants are instructed to document every spontaneous intrusive 
memory in their everyday life, several factors outside of experimental control will influence 
this measurement: participants may differ in the frequency of encountering potential trauma 
reminders, which may cause systematic differences in the occurrence of intrusive memories. 
Furthermore, as participants must keep in mind that their task is to document every intrusive 
memory, interindividual differences in motivation and personality traits may influence the 
reliability of this assessment. Finally, the electronic mobile device itself may have the 
potential to act as a trauma reminder and thus may have inflated the number of intrusive 
memories.  
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3.3 STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES 
Study 1 demonstrated that pre-existing retrieval suppression is associated with reduced 
subjective distress ratings of intrusive trauma memories. It further indicates that the same 
inhibitory control process involved in retrieval suppression (as reflected by the N2 ERP 
component) is also involved in suppressing intrusive trauma memories. One major 
shortcoming, however, is the missing association between suppression-induced forgetting 
effects and the frequency of intrusive memories, so we found no direct evidence for a 
reduction in the number of intrusive trauma memories by retrieval suppression. More 
evidence is therefore needed to support the association between the two phenomena. 
Furthermore, Study 1 did not include an independent cue test for suppression-induced 
forgetting in the think/no-think task. As stated above (see section IV-2.1), significant 
reductions in no-think items in the independent cue test are usually taken as strong evidence 
for an inhibitory control process actively suppressing the accessibility of the target 
(Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson et al., 2004). Based on 
the results of Study 1, the possibility that interference may have caused the forgetting effects 
cannot be excluded. Instead of directly suppressing the target word, participants may 
actually have applied another strategy (e.g. remembering a different word) to avoid retrieval 
of the target, even though we tried to avoid the usage of such alternative strategies by 
thoroughly instructing and training participants to directly suppress the target words (as 
recommended by Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005). Furthermore, 
the observed N2 as a reaction to no-think items also indicates the employment of an 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  120 
 
inhibitory control process, which has previously been linked to inhibiting a prepotent motor 
response (Mecklinger et al., 2009). 
A second shortcoming of the findings from the think/no-think task is that the relatively low 
number of successfully learned word pairs in Study 1 did not allow us to control for prior 
learning success. Previous studies have achieved this by including only those items in the 
analysis that have been recalled correctly after the initial learning phase (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2004; Benoit et al., 2014; Mecklinger et al., 2009), thus excluding words that have not been 
learned in the first place. It is unlikely, however, that there is no learning effect for these 
words at all, as they have been repeated as often as the successfully learned words, so these 
words may also have intruded during the think/no-think phase, engaged the same control 
processes to suppress their automatic retrieval, and led to suppression-induced forgetting. 
This relatively low initial learning success was also the reason for not including a subsequent 
forgetting analysis (i.e. examination of the differences in ERP correlates between retrieved 
and successfully forgotten target words) in the current study as has been done in previous 
studies (Anderson et al., 2004; Kuhl, Dudukovic, Kahn, & Wagner, 2007; Mecklinger et al., 
2009). Thus, in Study 1 the neural correlates of successful retrieval suppression could not be 
separated from the correlates of attempts to suppress retrieval that did not lead to forgetting. 
3.4 STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
Study 2 provides evidence for the important role conditioned responses play in the 
occurrence of intrusive trauma memories, yet there are two major shortcomings limiting the 
inferences based on these findings: no significant correlations were observed for 
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physiological measures (SCL, HR) of conditioned responses, and no beneficial effects of 
imaginal exposure to the traumatic film were observed. 
Even though significant conditioning effects were observed for subjective measures (IMQ, 
STAI-S) in Study 2, no such effects were observed for more objective physiological 
parameters (SCL, HR). The most plausible reason for this null-effect is the relative mildness 
of the traumatic film. As discussed above (see section IV-3.1), viewing a film, even if it is 
very distressing, may not be sufficient to cause conditioned physiological reactions.  
Alternatively, this pattern of results may imply that the subjective results reflect effects of 
demand characteristics (Nichols & Maner, 2008; Orne, 1962). That is, participants may have 
inferred that the trauma-associated sounds were supposed to trigger intrusive memories of 
the traumatic film and to elicit fear responses, which may have biased their ratings 
accordingly. Even though, an attempt was made to minimize these effects by concealing the 
purpose of the memory triggering task from participants, as in most psychological 
experiments, effects of demand characteristics cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty.  
Furthermore, the missing effects of imaginal exposure need to be mentioned: In Study 2, 
instructing participants to remember and imagine the traumatic film did not lead to reduced 
intrusive memories as compared to the neutral film. Potential explanations for this null-effect 
have already been discussed above (see sections III-5 and IV-2.2.2). As several meta-
analyses indicate that trauma-focused treatment approaches provide the best outcomes for 
PTSD (Bisson et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 2005; Cloitre, 2009; Ehlers et al., 2010; Seidler & 
Wagner, 2006; Van Etten & Taylor, 1998), these results should not be interpreted as general 
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ineffectiveness of imaginal exposure. The underlying memory mechanism, however, 
remains unclear. 
4 OUTLOOK AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
An outlook and further directions for future research, based on the limitations and caveats 
stated above, will be provided in the following sections. 
4.1 STUDY 1: MEMORY CONTROL AND INTRUSIVE TRAUMA MEMORIES 
As stated above (section IV-3.3), the results from Study 1 would be even more convincing if 
a correlation between retrieval suppression and the frequency of intrusive trauma memories 
had been found. To address this issue, future studies could implement more aversive stimuli 
or investigate retrieval suppression in participants who are likely to be exposed to a real-life 
trauma. For example, assessing retrieval suppression ability in soldiers before they are sent 
to a military operation and correlating their performance with later PTSD symptoms may 
provide new insights. Another approach would include think/no-think training (i.e. 
repeatedly performing the think/no-think task over several days) in order to provide evidence 
for a causal relationship between retrieval suppression and intrusive trauma memories. To 
the best of my knowledge, however, there is no evidence yet for the trainability of retrieval 
suppression, so it would be a good first step to test whether this ability can be trained 
successfully.  
Furthermore, future studies should disentangle potential memory suppression effects during 
encoding of traumatic memories from the effects of suppressing memory retrieval. This 
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could be accomplished, for example, by examining the way instructing participants to 
disrupt encoding or suppress automatic retrieval of a traumatic event affects intrusive trauma 
memories. Alternatively, as a first step, researchers could test whether the different forms of 
forgetting (i.e. suppression-induced forgetting, directed forgetting) are associated with each 
other and can be attributed to the same neural mechanisms. 
An alternative explanation for the results observed in Study 1 might be that the same control 
process underlying retrieval suppression may also be involved in regulating emotional 
reactions (see section IV-2.1.5). There is already some evidence for this connection, as 
overlapping brain areas seem to be involved in both processes, however, further research is 
needed to support these findings. Future studies should investigate whether the same control 
process is involved in retrieval suppression and emotion regulation, for example, by 
assessing both paradigms for the same participants. Additionally, including an analogue 
trauma paradigm would also provide insights about potential connections to intrusive trauma 
memories. 
4.2 STUDY 2: CONDITIONED RESPONSES TO TRAUMA REMINDERS 
As mentioned above (see section IV-2.2.1), it would be even more convincing if the pattern 
of results observed for conditioned intrusive memories and anxiety had also been observed 
for physiological parameters (SCL, HR). The absence of these effects may be due to 
relatively low contingency of the CS+, as its timing was not as precise as in typical fear 
conditioning paradigms. Future studies could improve contingency for CS+ stimuli by 
presenting them immediately preceding the most aversive moments of a traumatic film.  
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Alternatively, this pattern of results may reflect effects of demand characteristics (see section 
IV-3.4; Nichols & Maner, 2008; Orne, 1962), so that participants may have inferred the 
purpose of the memory triggering task in a way that biased their ratings. In future studies, 
effects of demand characteristics may be controlled for by including a post-experimental 
assessment of the “perceived awareness of the research hypothesis” (PARH; Rubin, Paolini, 
& Crisp, 2010). 
Several characteristics of Study 2 that may have resulted in the absent effects of imaginal 
exposure have already been discussed above (see section III-5 and IV-1.2). Future studies 
could address these potential shortcomings in the current design by separating measurements 
of initial reactions to the trauma film more carefully from reactions to imaginal exposure 
(e.g. by separating film presentation and imaginal exposure by a longer time interval), by 
examining intrusive memories over a longer period of time, and by implementing a different 
control group (e.g. an inactive control group). Furthermore, implementing more sessions of 
imaginal exposure may enhance the beneficial effects of imaginal exposure, as in typical 
clinical practice multiple sessions of imaginal exposure are also held. Finally, potential 
extinction effects of the memory triggering task, possibly overlaying treatment effects of 
imaginal exposure, could be ruled out by assessing the MTT only at a follow-up session in 
future studies.  
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Two experimental analogue trauma studies addressing separate research questions have 
successfully demonstrated that (1) retrieval suppression is associated with less distressing 
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intrusive trauma memories. In addition, the same neural process seems to be involved in 
both phenomena. Furthermore, (2) our findings support the assumption that intrusive trauma 
memories are comprised, at least partially, of a conditioned reaction to trauma reminders, as 
these memories were observed in reaction to trauma reminders and remained stable over a 
time period of one week. 
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VI APPENDIX 
1 ABBREVIATIONS 
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
CMS Common Mode Sense 
CR Conditioned reaction 
CS Conditioned stimulus 
CS- Negative conditioned stimulus 
CS+ Positive conditioned stimulus 
d Cohen’s measure of effect size 
dACC Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
dlPFC Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
dmPFC Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
DSM-5 Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.) 
ECG Electrocardiogram 
EEG Electroencephalogram 
EMDR Eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing 
ERP Event-related Potential 
F F-ratio (used in ANOVA) 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
HR Heart Rate 
Hz Hertz 
IAPS International affective picture system 
IES-R Impact of Event Scale — Revised 
IMQ Intrusive Memory Questionnaire 
ISI Interstimulus interval 
M Mean 
MTL Mediotemporal lobe 
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MTT Memory triggering task 
N2 Negative peak 350-450 ms after stimulus 
OFC Orbitofrontal cortex 
p p-value 
PARH Perceived awareness of the research hypothesis 
PTSD Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
r Linear correlation coefficient (Pearson) 
rACC Rostal anterior cingulated cortex 
RS Retrieval suppression 
SAM Search of associative memory 
SC Skin conductance 
SCL Skin conductance level 
SCR Skin conductance response 
SD Standard Deviation 
SEM Standard error of mean 
SSRI Specific serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
STAI State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
t t-test value 
TFCBT  Trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy 
TNT Think/no-think 
UCS Unconditioned stimulus 
vmPFC Ventromedial prefrontal cortex  
ηp
2 
Partial eta squared 
μS Micro siemens 
ω2 Omega-squared 
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2 DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
Table VI-1:  Diagnostic criteria of PTSD according to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder  
A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence in one (or more) of the following ways: 
1. Directly experienced the traumatic event(s). 
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to others. 
3. Learning that the traumatic events(s) occurred to a close family member or close friend. In cases of actual 
threatened death of a family member or friend, the event(s) must have been violent or accidental. 
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s) 
B. Presence of one (or more) of the following intrusion symptoms associated with the traumatic events(s), beginning 
after the traumatic events(s) occurred: 
1. Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s). 
2. Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content and/or affect of the dream are related to the traumatic 
event(s). 
3. Dissociative reactions (e.g. flashbacks) in which the individual feels or acts as if the traumatic event(s) were 
recurring. 
4. Intense or prolonged psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s). 
5. Marked physiological reactions to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the 
traumatic event(s). 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) 
occurred, as evidenced by one or both of the following: 
1. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with 
the traumatic event(s). 
2. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders that arouse distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings 
about or closely associated with the traumatic event(s). 
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after 
the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or more) of the following: 
1. Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s). 
2. Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about oneself, others or the world. 
3. Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of the traumatic event(s) that lead the 
individual to blame himself/herself or others. 
4. Persistent negative emotional state. 
5. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities. 
6. Feelings of detachment or estrangement from others. 
7. Persistent inability to experience positive emotions 
E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after 
the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or more) of the following: 
1. Irritable behavior and angry outbursts typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression towards people or 
objects. 
2. Reckless or self-destructive behavior. 
3. Hypervigilance. 
4. Exaggerated startle response. 
5. Problems with concentration. 
6. Sleep disturbances. 
F. Duration of the disturbance is more than 1 month. 
G. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 
of functioning. 
H. The disturbance is not attributable to physiological effects of a substance or another medical condition. 
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